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3 
Foreword 
Autonomous/Automated vehicles (AVs) are becoming a reality. Prototyping and testing of autonomous 
vehicles technologies is increasingly happening around the world. The safe deployment of autonomous 
vehicles includes many different technologies, competences and processes, which must be tested and 
evaluated with a high degree of accuracy because the safety in road transportation may be at risk. At the 
same time, machine learning and artificial intelligence is becoming increasingly important in the digital 
world and this is an essential element of autonomous vehicles. The robustness of machine learning and 
artificial intelligence must be tested both against unintentional and intentional adversarial events. The 
latter may be due to cybersecurity threats, which can become present in the evolution of the road 
transport including the future deployment of AVs. Before AVs are actually deployed in the road 
infrastructure, all these aspects must be evaluated and tested with a rigorous process, which can be quite 
cumbersome due to the complexity of AVs as cyber physical system and the road infrastructure context 
where AVs have to operate. To gain a better understanding of these aspects and how they are linked 
among them, DG.JRC.E3 has started a study on testing and certification of autonomous vehicles with a 
focus on artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, whose output is this report. 
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Executive summary 
This report focuses on the testing and certification of autonomous vehicles (AV) and the technologies and 
components used in their implementation. Autonomous vehicles are very complex cyber physical 
systems composed by many inter-connected components like sensors, actuators and artificial 
intelligence processors. They are supposed to operate with high accuracy and safety with limited 
presence of human drivers or completely in their absence (i.e., driverless cars). In addition, they are 
supposed to be robust against unintentional or intentional malfunctions, which can be caused by 
cybersecurity threats as vehicles will be increasingly connected, which can be exploited by cybersecurity 
attackers.  
The report reviews the existing activities at global and European level for testing and certification of 
autonomous vehicles with a particular focus on the current revision of the UNECE regulatory framework. 
Then, the report focuses on three separate elements of testing of automated vehicles: a) definition of 
processes for cybersecurity testing and mitigation of cybersecurity threats, b) testing and evaluation of 
artificial intelligence components of the automated vehicles and c) definition of database scenarios and 
languages for testing of automated vehicles. These areas have been selected because they address gaps 
in the policy support analysis needed by DG GROW C.4. 
On each of these areas, the report identifies key recommendations at regulatory and standardization 
level. 
Policy context 
Type approval of vehicles is a specific concept of Type Approval applied to the automotive sector. The 
current regulatory framework for Type Approval of motor vehicles is centered on the United Nation’s 
World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations, which is charged with creating unified automotive 
standards and regulations to facilitate international trade. 
The revision of the UNECE regulations for automated vehicles has been the focus of the work of Working 
Party 29 (WP29), which is a unique worldwide regulatory forum within the institutional framework of the 
UNECE Inland Transport Committee. In particular, Working Party on Automated/Autonomous and 
Connected Vehicles (GRVA) was created on June 2018 to revise the Type approval regulation for the future 
automated/autonomous and connected vehicles with a list of priorities, which included definition of 
Functional Requirements (“FRAV”), Validation Method for Automated Driving ("VMAD"), Cyber security 
(and software updates), ADAS and Braking Systems. 
Key conclusions 
Type approval (including testing and certification) of automated vehicles may be a very complex task 
where there are still many open questions at regulatory, industry and research level. This report 
proposes a set of recommendations for policy makers, standardization bodies, industry and research 
communities to foster an adequate testing of automated vehicles before they are deployed in the market.  
Main findings 
This report provides a set of recommendations in the different different areas of cybersecurity, artificial 
intelligence, software update in AV and scenarios defintion for Type Approval of AVs.  
Regarding cybersecurity aspects, the report recommends a review of existing accreditation schemes in 
Europe to verify if they are adequate to support the auditing of the Cyber Security Management System 
(CSMS) of AV manufacturers. In addition, the report recommends the set-up of a vulnerability database 
and an associated process for the reporting of threats and vulnerabilities in AV (for all levels of 
automation) at European level.  
Regarding Artificial Intelligence in AV this report recommends the definition of harmonized metrics to 
evaluate the test coverage of artificial intelligence algorithms and to improve research efforts to make 
the AI components in AVs more robust against adversary machine learning. 
Regarding the design and implementation of software update in AV, this report recommends an increase 
in research and standardization efforts to improve the efficiency and coverage of of software testing in 
particular for the software update. Efficiency is needed to support a rapid assessment and deployment of 
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software updates in the AVs present in the field. Coverage is needed to ensure that sotware updates are 
tested in the widest set of scenarios and contexts. 
Regarding the Type approval of AV, various recommendations are put forward. One recommendation 
requires the definition of a common scenario database based on a common language at European level 
and the definition of common processes with a clear definition of roles for the main stakeholders in the 
AV domain. Another recommendation is to support the definition of adequate metrics for the selection and 
filtering of scenarios. In addition, this report recommends the definition of a process to collect 
information from the market, which can be used to improve the scenario definition and the scenario 
database.   
Related and future JRC work 
This report is related to other reports produced by the JRC in the area of road transportation, artificial 
intelligence, cybersecurity and type approval. In particular, it is related to the ‘The future of road transport 
- Implications of automated, connected, low-carbon and shared mobility’ (EC 2019c) for the aspects or 
road transportation. This report is related to the JRC report investigating the robustness of Artificial 
Intelligence in the digital domain (Robustness and Explainability of Artificial Intelligence (EC 2020b)). 
Regarding Cybersecurity aspects in the digital society, this report is related to the report ‘Cybersecurity, 
our digital anchor’ (EC 2020c). Regarding the aspects of type approval of automotive vehicles, this report 
is related to (Galassi 2020a). 
The JRC will continue to support DG GROW and DG MOVE in the evolution of road transport with a 
particular focus on the Type Approval of AV, cybersecurity aspects and the application of Artificial 
Intelligence in AV. 
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1 Introduction 
Autonomous or automated driving (in the rest of this report the two terms are used in the same meaning) 
is a new technology, which has the promise to change dramatically our life. One of the main current 
references on automated driving (SAE 2016a) defines 6 levels of automated driving starting from level 0 
with no automation to level 6, which is the fully automated vehicles. There are already in the market 
Autonomous Vehicles (AV) up to level 3 and level 4 are expected to be in the market in the next 3-4 years 
(Bhutani 2018). 
At the same time, the automotive industry is changing rapidly in different dimensions: the increasing shift 
to electric vehicles, the application of different forms of connectivity to modern vehicles (DSRC and 
cellular connectivity), the greater sensitivity to cybersecurity and privacy concerns. All these changes 
will integrate each other in ways yet to be seen. 
Regulators are facing this evolving scenario and they have the challenge to formulate adequate policies 
which (on one side) ensure the safety of citizens and (on another side) foster the development and 
deployment the market and innovation in AVs industry. One important aspect, which is addressed in this 
report, is the testing of AVs (i.e., Type Approval or homologation), which is expected to be evolve and/or 
be integrated in the current regulatory framework of Type Approval (UN 1958), (EC 2019b).  
The validation and verification of AVs poses interesting challenges: in particular the testing of the 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) components, which is supposed to replace the human driver component. 
Testing of cybersecurity aspects is also quite important because a cybersecurity threat to AVs may 
produce significant safety hazards.  
Regulators, standardization bodies and industry have already started to look at testing of AVs (see 
Section 2.2 for a review of the current activities). The aim of this report is to investigate and summarize 
the current activities in this area and analyze in detail specific testing aspects including the assessment 
of the AI component of the AVs, testing of cybersecurity, definition of AV testing scenarios and related 
scenario database. 
Note: a definition of the concepts identified in this report is provided in the List of Definitions at the end of 
this report.   
1.1 Problem statement 
Autonomous driving systems will be one of the most complex systems ever implemented and they aim to 
replicate the driving capabilities of human beings. AVs are arguably going to be heavily based on artificial 
intelligence algorithms in a cyber-physical system. Even if AI has achieved remarkable capabilities in 
many areas, their application to a domain where safety aspects are relevant requires additional care. In 
particular, AV needs to be carefully evaluated before their deployment in the market. This is a novel area 
of work and it presents many challenges. The main challenge is to guarantee a complete coverage of 
testing for all the possible driving situations. This is a slow and costly process, which could hamper the 
market deployment of these technologies. Moreover, we cannot allow untested vehicles to be deployed 
on the road. This trade-off is one of the most significant challenge for testing and certification of AVs.  
Another significant challenge is that, AVs may be based on updatable software which may subject to 
another testing and certification phase. From this point of view, a fine balance must be reached between 
the need to deliver software updates to the AVs in time to support their operational needs and the need to 
properly test the software update before distribution to AVs. This aspect is particularly important for the 
software update and testing of AI algorithms, which implement the cognitive capabilities of the AV and 
which are directly related to safety hazards on the road. 
Finally, the potential of cybersecurity attacks should also be addressed as cybersecurity can generate 
significant safety hazards when the driver is absent or not full in control. Even if government, industry and 
research communities have increased their attention to cybersecurity aspects of AVs (e.g., identification 
of threats and vulnerabilities), cybersecurity testing of AVs is a novel area, which still requires further 
developments. 
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1.2 Scope of the report 
The scope of this report is to analyze in detail the challenges identified in the problem statement  above. 
In particular, the report identifies and analyzes the most significant challenges in the testing and 
certification of AVs at the technical level for three specific aspects: cybersecurity testing, testing of the 
artificial intelligence component in AV and definition of the database scenarios to drive the Type Approval 
process of AVs. The report focuses on these specific aspects because they are considered the highest 
priorities for the testing of automated vehicles (see Section 2) and because they address gaps in the policy 
support analysis for the upcoming Type Approval regulations in Europe for AVs. 
The scope of this report is not to provide a comprehensive view on the evolution of the Type Approval for 
AVs. This aspect is addressed in other JRC reports. See for example (Galassi 2020a).  
This report does not address specific organizational aspects related to the assessment of AV 
manufacturers or other stakeholders involved in the Type Approval process. 
This report has been produced to support DG GROW.C.4 for the drafting of policies for the Type Approval 
of automated vehicles in Europe. 
1.3 Structure of the report 
● Section 2 describes the overall framework for testing and validation of autonomous vehicles 
and a description of the main components. This section also provides a review on the current 
regulatory, industry and standardization activities on testing and validation of AVs. 
● Section 3 This section focuses on the risk assessment process, cybersecurity certification 
and secure software update processes, which may part of the future Type Approval 
framework. 
● Section 4. This section focuses on the specific aspect of testing and certification of the 
artificial intelligence (AI) component in the AV. In particular, it deals on the aspects related to 
robustness of the artificial intelligence algorithms against intentional and unintentional 
malfunctions. 
● Section 5. This section focuses on the definition of scenarios for AVs focuses on the definition 
of scenario for the testing of AVs including cybersecurity and AI aspects. Coverage of testing 
scenarios, the ratio of real and simulated scenarios and metrics for scenario evaluation are 
the aspects addressed in this section. 
● Section 6 provides recommendations to policy makers and standardization bodies based on 
the results of the analysis. 
● Section 7 provides the conclusions and future developments. 
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2 Testing and certification of autonomous vehicles: a multidisciplinary 
approach 
Testing and certification of AVs may require a multidisciplinary approach which includes a variety of 
disciplines. AVs are still essentially machines, represented in their simplest form as a combination of a 
vehicle body, wheels, tires and some method (e.g., electric or fuel based) of propulsion. The absence of 
the human driver component makes the verification and validation of AVs before market deployment a 
complex task. Testing of AVs should include assessment of cyber physical design of the AVs, testing of the 
AI components, cybersecurity assessment, evaluation of the quality of the sensors and certification of the 
methods to update the AVs functions (e.g., software update). This is not an exhaustive list as all the human 
driving functions must be assessed.  
To replicate the human driving functions, the AVs must implement a set of functions, which are pictorially 
described in the following Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1 The different functions of Automated Vehicles 
A brief description of the different functions of automated vehicles is shown below: 
 Perception of the environment. This function is responsible to collect information from the road 
infrastructure using the sensors, which are installed in the vehicle: cameras, LIDARs, Inertial 
Measurement Units (IMU) and so on. This may include also messages received from the road 
infrastructure or other vehicles through wireless communication means. 
 Interpretation of the context. This function is responsible to interpret the data received from the 
sensors and prepare it for the reasoning process. For example, the interpretation of a sign is part 
of this function. 
 Reasoning. This function includes all the Artificial Intelligence (AI) subtasks, which must create a 
cohesive understanding from the interpretations created by the function below. For example, the 
interpretation of the image of a pedestrian crossing the road must be correlated with the current 
speed information received from the odometer to understand if a decision must be taken. 
Perception of the 
environment
Interpretation of 
the context
Reasoning
Acting and taking 
decisions
Executing the 
decisions
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 Acting and taking decision. This function is responsible to make a decision from the output of the 
reasoning function. Taking the example of the reasoning function, this function may decide to turn 
the vehicle left or right, braking or both actions. 
 Executing the decisions. This function is responsible to execute the decision taken in the previous 
function above. For example, the AV may decide to brake. 
Theoretically all these functions must be tested in the Type Approval/homologation phase of the AV.  
There are a number of challenges to achieve this objective as discussed in following subsection 2.3. For 
example, the decision of an AV in a specific scenario must not only be correct (e.g., the pedestrian is 
avoided) but also executed in a timely fashion (e.g., change of collision course with another vehicle is 
executed in a specific time). It is also difficult to anticipate a priori all the potential situations where an AV 
can be involved. 
Each of these functions mentioned above can also be the target for a cybersecurity attack, which may 
hamper the behavior of the AVs in the road, with the risk of safety hazards or non-conformance to 
regulations. 
 
2.1 Testing framework 
To introduce some of the concepts, which are described more in detail in the rest of this report, we provide 
a high-level overview of what could be the main components of a testing framework in the Figure 2 below. 
Some of the testing activities will be described more in detail in the rest of the report. 
 
 
Figure 2 Potential Type Approval phases 
A brief description of each phase is reported below. Some of the phases will be further described in the 
rest of this report: 
 Requirements definition. The requirements from regulations at international level (UNECE 
2020a), (UNECE 2020b) (see subsection 2.2.1) can be used to drive the definition of scenarios 
together with other sources of information including the operational contexts (urban 
environment, highways) where the AVs must operate. 
 Database of scenarios. A database scenario is created either at government level or for the 
specific manufacturer. Depending on the specific model type of AV (commercial vehicle or 
passenger vehicle), specific scenarios should/could be selected from the overall set of 
scenarios. 
 Testing. Each scenario can be used in a different testing environment: a controlled test track 
environment, real traffic testing in a normal traffic environment or a simulated environment. 
Regulatory 
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Scenario
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Some scenarios are specific for cybersecurity testing to assess the robustness of the AV against 
cybersecurity threats. 
 Feedback from the market deployment. After the deployment phase, information from the 
performance of the AV in the field can be used as a feedback to the definition of high level 
requirements for the creation or update of existing testing scenarios. 
 
2.2 Review of the state of art 
This subsection aims to review the state of art in different areas: regulatory and policy frameworks, 
report from industry and industry association and from the research community. A subsection on the 
current standardization activities in this sector (e.g., SAE) is also included. 
 
2.2.1 Regulatory/Policy frameworks 
Type Approval of vehicles is a specific concept of Type Approval applied to the automotive sector. The 
current regulatory framework for Type Approval of motor vehicles is centered on the United Nation’s 
World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations, which is in the charge of creating unified 
automotive standards and regulations to facilitate international trade. Currently, under the auspices of 
the Forum, more than 100 separate regulations applicable to passenger vehicles have been developed. 
Three UN Agreements, adopted in 1958, 1997 and 1998, provide the legal framework allowing Contracting 
Parties (member countries) attending the WP.29 sessions to establish regulatory instruments 
concerning motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. 
The revision of the UNECE regulations for automated vehicles has been the focus of the work of Working 
Party 291 . As described in the WP29 web site: “The UNECE World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle 
Regulations (WP.29) is a unique worldwide regulatory forum within the institutional framework of the 
UNECE Inland Transport Committee”. 
In particular, Working Party on Automated/Autonomous and Connected Vehicles (GRVA) was created on 
June 2018 to revise the Type approval regulation for the future automated/autonomous and connected 
vehicles with a list of priorities (the following test is extracted from (UNECE 2020c)), which included 
definition of Functional Requirements (“FRAV”), Validation Method for Automated Driving ("VMAD"), Cyber 
security (and software updates), ADAS and braking Systems. This report focuses only on specific aspects 
of the revision of automated vehicles. Recently (June 2020) the regulations for cybersecurity (UNECE 
2020a) and Over The Air (OTA) software update in automated vehicles (UNECE 2020b) have been approved 
by the GRVA steering board and they are discussed in this report in Section 2.2.1. 
In the European Union, Type Approval is regulated by ECE Regulations and by Decision 97/836/EC (EC 
1997). As described in (EC 2007), “when the Community has decided to apply on a compulsory basis a 
UNECE Regulation for the purpose of EC vehicle type-approval in accordance with Article 4(4) of Decision 
97/836/EC, the annexes to the Frame Directive shall be amended as appropriate in accordance with the 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 40(2) .The UNECE Regulations listed in Part II of 
Annex IV are recognised as being equivalent to the corresponding separate directives or regulations in 
as much as they share the same scope and subject matter. Where the Community has decided to apply a 
new UNECE Regulation or a UNECE Regulation as amended, Part II of Annex IV shall be amended as 
appropriate”. 
We also note that automotive EC Directives and ECE Regulations require third party approval - testing, 
certification and production conformity assessment by an independent body. Each member state is 
required to appoint an Approval Authority to issue the approvals, and a Technical Service to carry out the 
testing to the Directives and Regulations. 
The testing of essential operational and safety systems in automobiles is also the focus of national new 
car assessment programs (NCAPs). The NCAPs have been established in the late 1970s by the U.S. 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), NCAPs have been subsequently adopted by the 
                                          
1 https://www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/introduction.html 
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automotive industry in other parts of the world, including the European New Car Assessment Program 
(Euro NCAP)2. 
Even if it is not a regulation, the US report “Preparing for the Future of Transportation: Automated Vehicles 
3.0” (USDOT 2018) provides important recommendations on potential regulatory actions by the US 
Department of Transportation. In particular, the report claims that it is important to have federal 
regulations for AV, even if in general the U.S.A. does not have any unique federal regulations and only 
provides guidelines to the state governments. The primary focus of (USDOT 2018) is on safety and the 
integration of AVs with the existing road infrastructure and other modes of transportation. State, local, 
and tribal jurisdictions are identified as responsible for “licensing human drivers, registering motor 
vehicles, enacting and enforcing traffic laws, conducting safety inspections, and regulating motor vehicle 
insurance and liability” as well as “planning, building, managing and operating transit and the roadway 
infrastructure”. 
In Europe, (EC 2016) described the overall strategy for cooperative, connected and automated mobility, 
thus supporting the integration of connectivity and automated vehicles technologies. A list of specific 
actions are identified in the communications to foster the definition of compliance assessment process, 
support for hybrid connectivity, ensuring safety and security in the operation of cooperative, connected  
and automated technologies and so on. The actions are linked to on-going European projects like C-
ROADS (CROADS 2020). 
The European Commission(EC) also launched GEAR 2030 in 2016 to explore solutions to AV-related 
issues, and in February 2017 the group made recommendations for using Event Data Recording (EDR) 
devices. In May 2016, the European Parliament recommended that the EC should create a mandatory 
insurance scheme to safeguard full compensation for victims of AV accidents and a legal status should 
be created for all robots to determine liability in accidents. 
Since 2018, the JRC Sustainable Transport Unit in DG JRC supports the Commission (DG GROW) in the 
evaluation of different innovative approaches to be introduced in the new AVs type-approval legislation 
for the safety certification of automated vehicles. The JRC SAFE-TYPE project was setup in this 
framework and defines the objectives in terms of desktop and experimental research activities, as well 
as outreaching activities and collaboration in internationals working groups, including contribution to 
UNECE GRVA activities. See (Galassi 2020a) and (Galassi 2020b) for further details. 
2.2.2 Standardization activities 
Standardization bodies have started to investigate the development and testing of automated vehicles 
and their activities are reported here. 
ISO 26262, “Road vehicles – Functional safety.”  (ISO 26262) was originally published by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) in 2011 and represents an adaptation of IEC 61508, “Functional 
safety of electrical/ electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems.” The safety 
requirements in ISO 26262 are based on a qualitative assessment of specific risks linked to the 
malfunction of electrical and electronic systems under anticipated operating scenarios. 
SAE has been also particularly active in the area of automated vehicles and cybersecurity. SAE J3016 
(SAE 2016) has defined the levels of automated vehicles, which are commonly used in literature. SAE 
J3061 (SAE 2016a) establishes a set of high-level guiding principles for Cybersecurity as it relates to 
cyber-physical vehicle systems like automated vehicles. At the time of writing this report (August 2020), 
the standard is still under development but it should be finalized soon. 
The ISO/SAE DIS 21434 “Road vehicles — Cybersecurity engineering”, which is also under development at 
the time of writing this report (October 2020) defines requirements for cybersecurity risk management 
regarding engineering for concept, development, production, operation, maintenance, and 
decommissioning for road vehicle electrical and electronic (E/E) systems, including their components 
and interfaces. While the standard is for modern automotive vehicles in general, it can also be applied to 
automated vehicles (UNECE 2020a). 
Note that a more extensive study of the mapping of standards applicable to cybersecurity in automated 
vehicles in provided in Section 3 of this report. 
                                          
2 https://www.euroncap.com/ 
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2.2.3 Industry activities 
Industry has been obviously involved in the development and production of AVs in recent years with levels 
2 and 3 of automation already deployed in the road that provides significant competitiveness advantages 
to the AV manufacturers. 
In this subsection, we briefly report on positions papers produced by industry representatives or industry 
associations in relation to regulatory aspects and more precisely on testing/certification of AVs. 
ACEA produced a position paper in 2019 (ACEA 2019) “Roadmap for the deployment of automated driving 
in the European Union”, which identifies a time plan and key regulations, which should be defined for the 
deployment of AVs in the market. Some of the regulations are already in place (Cybersecurity Act) but  
others should be created ex-novo. The proposed set of regulations are identified within their context 
(international or European) and a for a wide range of aspects: safety, cybersecurity and so on. 
The author in (TUV 2020) focuses on the regulatory aspects for the homologation of AV. The position paper 
reviews the current regulatory status and claims that there are still significant regulatory gaps to be 
fulfilled. Then, the position paper proposes a six-point approach for developing future homologation and 
approval regulations for automated vehicles, which is based on: 
1. Establish scenario-based testing approach as state of the art. 
2. Establish a comprehensive and globally-accessible database for testing scenarios. 
3. Determine the criticality metrics essential to safe automated operation. 
4. Integrate simulation into the homologation process and recognize the validity of virtual methods 
in regulatory approval schemes. 
5. Enforce the assessment of functional safety in the certification or homologation process. 
6. Use real-world driving as a final validation of operational safety. 
BMW e-book on autonomous vehicles (BWM 2020) also gives some indications on the potential 
regulations actions. One key recommendation is that manual, automated, and self-driving modes each 
need their own regulation because humans and machines are too different in their reaction times and in 
how they perceive and analyze traffic situations for the application of the same set of regulations. In 
addition, automated vehicles and humans learn about traffic regulations in different way.  In particular, 
AV must be able to learn traffic regulations using machine interpretable language, which should not leave 
space to ambiguities. There are also interoperability issues on traffic regulations definitions across 
different jurisdictions, which can be relatively easy to interpret by human beings through signs, but AVs 
may also receive the rules in a digital format (see also (Baldini 2020) for a discussion on machine 
interpretable traffic regulations and a potential deployment approach).  
The PEGASUS project was promoted by German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) 
for the establishment of generally accepted quality criteria, tools and methods as well as scenarios and 
situations for the release of highly-automated driving functions. Its objective is to develop and 
demonstrate methods, criteria, tools and guidelines to safeguard highly automated driving functions 
(Level 3), in order to facilitate the rapid implementation of automated driving into practice (PEGASUS, 
2020). In particular, the PEGASUS project has defined a comprehensive framework for the verification 
and validation of automated vehicles like the one shown in Figure 3 below, which describes the overall 
flows and key components of the framework.  
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Figure 3 PEGASUS framework for verification and validation of automated vehicles (From 
(PEGAGUS 2020)) 
2.2.4 Research studies 
In this section, we report on recent studies on the comparison of regulatory frameworks for automated 
vehicles. Because automated vehicles technologies and related regulations activities are quite recent, 
only studies in the period 2018-2020 are evaluated. 
The conclusions of the references study are reported. This does not imply the acceptance of the 
conclusions by the author of this report and/or the European Commission. 
(Taeihagh 2019) have conducted an extensive review of the regulatory activities (or lack of them) in 
various parts of the world with specific focus on liability, cybersecurity, privacy and societal impact. The 
conclusions by the authors of the study show that a number of regulatory challenges must still be 
resolved. In particular, the liability scheme is not clear on who/which entity should take the liability in case 
of an AV accident. The societal impact on the job destruction (e.g., commercial vehicle drivers and taxi 
drivers) due to the introduction of AVs was also pointed out as a priority for government. The study 
highlighted the risk for cybersecurity and privacy and pointed out to various initiatives to mitigate related 
threats through a combination of regulations, best practices and standards to be adopted. 
A study and comparison among regulatory frameworks for automated vehicles is also available in (Lee 
2020), The report compares existing government activities and recent regulatory actions around the 
world. In particular, the study examines in detail the regulatory activities by USA (with a focus on 
California), Europe (with a focus on Germany) and Australia. The study highlighted some potential 
challenges not only related to safety and liability aspects due to malfunctions of AVs, but also issues in 
the public acceptance of AV technologies in the field. Then, the study reports various best practices, which 
could be adopted (and which are also related to testing, which is the scope of this report) including: 
 On-road testing of vehicles should have at least one human safety driver who is ready to take 
control to maximize safety until the on-road testing of AVs is more advanced. 
 The requirement of a black box for safety investigations, which is already implemented in some 
countries, would help to improve knowledge and to determine liability in the event of an accident. 
 Test drivers of AV and remote monitors should be able to deactivate the system easily and at any 
time. 
 Test drivers of AV should receive a specific training. 
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(Shladover 2019) reports on the experiences and lessons learnt from the initial regulation activities and 
testing of AV in the state of California in USA.  The authors of the study identified some specific certification 
challenges (which are also discussed in the rest of this report): 
 It is important and difficult to distinguish between the capabilities or competency and the 
functional safety of the automated driving system because these are developed and deployed in 
a different way. Competency describes how well the automation behaves when dealing with 
hazards in the normal external driving environment, while functional safety describes how well 
the system deals with internal faults and failures”. 
 It is not clear if the certification should be performed by an independent third party, by the 
manufacturer itself through a self-certification or by the government as a specific type of 
independent third party. Each of these approaches has advantage and disadvantages. 
 It is difficult to ascertain if an automated vehicle system is sufficiently safe that it should be 
permitted to use public roads on a regular basis.  
Some of the challenges identified by the authors are summarized in the following subsection 2.3. 
 
2.3 Summary of the challenges for testing and certification  
We summarize the challenges for testing and certification identified in the previous sections: 
 Regulations for testing of automated vehicles should be harmonized at international level (this 
challenge is currently addressed by UNECE WP29 GRVA) 
 Testing in real traffic conditions requires special conditions and training for the test drivers and 
manufacturers because the AV is not yet Type Approved in the testing phase and software 
failures may create safety hazards. 
 Testing of AVs is a very complex task, which should be addressed using different testing phases 
and environments. 
 Testing coverage is difficult to determine a-priori in comparison to the Type Approval of 
conventional vehicles as the space of potential scenarios could be unlimited. 
 Cybersecurity testing is particularly important in the testing of AV because of the safety hazards 
and the potential absence or limited presence of a human controller. 
 Because AV can be dependent on software updates to improve the AI components of the AV, 
periodic testing and calibration should be performed during the lifecycle of the AV. This is also 
needed because AI algorithms are dependent on the quality of the data originating by the sensors 
which could degrade in time. 
Some of these challenges will be further discussed in the rest of this report in relation to cybersecurity 
testing, testing of artificial intelligence and scenario database. 
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3 Assessment of cybersecurity aspects for testing of autonomous vehicles 
Assessment of cybersecurity aspects for autonomous vehicle is a wide area, which can involve different 
processes and roles. It is also an emerging discipline because AV are still mostly in a prototype phase 
regarding the highest levels of automation (level 5 of SAE automated vehicles levels) but lower levels of 
automation are already deployed and there is an increasing awareness of cybersecurity threats of AVs, 
also because of the parallel introductions of different forms of connectivity in modern vehicles, which can 
extend the surface attack. The reason is that cybersecurity attackers do not need to physically access the 
vehicle to implement the attack, but they can connect remotely through the connectivity link. One example 
of this possibility was shown by (Miller 2015), where researchers were able to perform a remote attack 
against an unaltered 2014 Jeep Cherokee which resulted in physical control of some components of the 
vehicle. 
Then, the aim of this section is firstly to provide a high level view of the cybersecurity aspects in AVs and 
what types of processes should be set up including risk assessment and vulnerability analysis. In many 
cases, existing standards in the cybersecurity domain can be customized and tailored to the AV context to 
support the implementation of these processes. In other cases, standards, which were started 
specifically for the AV context, are still under development at the time of writing this report. 
Then, the section discusses specific aspects like the secure development and engineering process 
(which must be evaluated in the audit process), the aspects related to software and hardware integrity, 
how the lifecycle of autonomous vehicles is related to cybersecurity aspects (when an update must be 
performed and how the cybersecurity certification is affected).  Deployment aspects are also considered: 
definition of organization and capabilities needed by specific elements of the AV operational framework. 
Related standards are also identified. 
Three main sets of processes are identified:  
1. A set of processes for the cybersecurity testing and certification of the AV type focuses on the 
identification of the main risks, threat scenarios and testing of the potential mitigation techniques 
and solutions, which are adopted by the manufacturer. 
2. A set of processes for the cybersecurity assessment of the manufacturer is needed to ensure 
that specific standards for the design and development of AVs are met. The validation of these 
sets of processes is part of the audit process. 
3. Regarding the lifecycle of the AVs, a set of processes should also be set in place to support a 
trusted environment, which is robust against cybersecurity threats. These processes include 
security checks for third party providers, workshops, passengers and drivers (at levels of 
automation less than 5) when they interact with AVs.  
Figure 4 shows the overall schema of the different processes, which can participate in the overall 
assessment of the AVs and the other parties involved in the AV context. 
To summarize, the structure of this section is following: 
 Section 3.1 identifies the key processes and roles involved in the cybersecurity aspects of 
automated vehicles. 
 Section 3.2 provides the potential applicability of key processes to the identified roles and entities 
(e.g., AVs). 
 Section 3.3 describes more in detail how the cybersecurity testing process of AVs (including 
verification and validations aspects) can be implemented. 
 Section 3.4 describes more in detail the assessment of organizations including the audit process. 
 Section 3.5 describes the processes involved in the monitoring of cybersecurity threats and 
vulnerabilities including market surveillance of AVs for cybersecurity aspects. 
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3.1 Identification of the key processes and roles 
 
Figure 4 identifies the main processes to be established to address cybersecurity aspects of AVs. 
 
Figure 4 Main processes, roles and entities for cybersecurity aspects of AVs 
The following main roles and entities are identified: 
 Manufacturer. It is the manufacturer of the AVs. 
 Automated Vehicle. It is the AV, whose type must be submitted to Type Approval (including 
cybersecurity testing). 
 Third party providers are application providers which can have telematics interfaces to the AVs. 
They can include insurance companies or other commercial companies. 
 Workshop. It is the workshop where the maintenance and periodic checks of the AVs is 
performed.  It can be a vehicle manufacturer workshop or a certified workshop. 
Additional roles/entities, which can be involved are: 
 Law enforcement, which can also be involved in cybersecurity accidents when they are related 
to the infringement of regulations or when such accidents can jeopardize the conformance of AVs 
to such regulations. 
 Automated vehicles components manufacturer and suppliers, which are responsible to provide 
components to the AVs manufacturers and they may satisfy specific security requirements 
defined by the manufacturers. In other words, they are the suppliers in the AV supply chain. 
 Passengers/drivers, which may be involved in cybersecurity and privacy aspects and who may 
be victim or cause of a cybersecurity threat to the AVs. 
The following Table 1 shows the main processes and entities and a potential proposal on how the 
processes can be allocated among them. It also describes how relevant standards can be associated to 
the processes. 
The following key processes are identified and described in the following Table 1. 
Automated 
VehicleManufacturer Workshop
Third Party
providers
Risk Management
Cybersecurity 
testing and 
certification
Security 
Engineering
Testing and 
calibration in the 
workshop
Security Training
and awareness
Software and 
hardware 
integrity
Threat monitoring 
and reporting
Security Controls
Organizational
Audit
Supply chain
integrity
Software 
download
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Note: the listing of specific relevant standards does not imply that the cited standard should be part of the 
identified process. The column Relevant Standards is only used to list standards, which could potentially 
be applied to the process described in the same row of Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Main processes and relevant standards 
Process Description  Relevant Standards 
Risk Management Risk Management is the process to 
identify, evaluate and prioritize risks (in 
this case related to cybersecurity threats) 
followed by the application of processes 
and resources to minimize, monitor, 
control the probability of impact of 
adversary events on the entity 
(organization, system), which is the object 
of the risk assessment. Risk is an effect of 
uncertainty on objectives and it can be 
measured as a combination of the impact 
of an event with the associated probability 
of an occurrence. 
ISO 31000 
Security Engineering Security Engineering is concerned with 
building systems, which are deployed to 
be secure and remain secure. Security 
engineering is used to achieve system 
assurance. Security engineering includes 
a number of techniques including 
computer security, cryptography, 
hardware and software integrity and so 
on.  
ISO 21827, SAE J3061, ISO 21434 
(under development) 
Cybersecurity Testing 
and Certification 
The processes required to test, verify and 
validate the cybersecurity requirements 
for an automated vehicle.  This process 
also includes the definition of 
cybersecurity testing scenarios. 
ISO 26262 (for the aspects of 
cybersecurity related to 
functional safety), SAE J3061 
(for cybersecurity best 
practices), UN Regulation on 
Cybersecurity and Cyber 
Security Management systems 
published by UNECE WG29, 
Common Criteria ISO 15408, EU 
Cybersecurity Act 
Regulation(EU) 2019/881, IEC 
62443. 
Security Controls Security controls are safeguards or 
countermeasures to avoid, detect, 
counteract or minimize cyber-security 
risks to a AV. 
ISO 27001, NIST SP 800-12 
Threat Monitoring and 
reporting 
This is the process to report the 
appearance of a vulnerability or a 
cybersecurity threat to one or more  AV  
types. 
EU Cybersecurity Act 
Regulation(EU) 2019/881. 
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Software and 
hardware integrity 
This is the process to guarantee the 
integrity of the functions of the software 
and hardware. Regarding software 
integrity, it is related to the software 
update process.  
UN Regulation on Cybersecurity 
and Cyber Security 
Management systems 
published by UNECE WG29 
(UNECE 2020a) and (UNECE 
2020b) 
Supply chain integrity This is a set of processes, policies and 
technologies used to provide 
transparency and products traceability on 
the supply chain to minimize the risk of the 
introduction of products and components, 
which are not secure, faulty or with 
suboptimal performance.  
ISO 28000 
Organizational Audit The set of processes required to perform 
the compliance of an organization 
regarding cybersecurity aspects. 
ISO 27001, ISO/IEC 17011 
Security Training and 
Awareness 
This is the set of processes to guarantee 
and maintain an adequate (i.e., adequate to 
the defined requirements) level of 
cybersecurity training of the human  
personnel involved in the operation and 
usage of automated vehicles. 
NIST 800-50. 
Testing and 
calibration in the 
workshop. 
This is the set of processes, which a 
laboratory/workshop may (depending on 
the specific regulatory framework) have 
the obligation to fulfil. 
ISO 17020:2012, ISO 17025:2017. 
Secure software 
download 
This is the process to ensure the download 
of new software versions in the AV. 
(UNECE 2020b), ISO 21434 
(under development) 
 
3.2 Identification of the key processes and allocation to roles 
This subsection describes in detail the specific processes, which should be adopted to implement the 
needed cybersecurity processes for testing and certification of autonomous vehicles  
 
Table 2 Potential applicability of processes for roles/entities in the context of cybersecurity of AVs 
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Security Engineering X  X  X  
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Cybersecurity Testing and 
Certification 
X  X  X  
Security Controls X X X    
Threat Monitoring and reporting X X X X X X 
Software and Hardware integrity   X  X  
Supply chain integrity X    X  
Organizational Audit X X X    
Security Training and Awareness X X X X X X 
Testing and calibration in the 
workshop. 
X X     
 
Notes on Table 1: 
 Risk Management processes may be applicable to any organization involved in the development, 
production and deployment of automated vehicles including the market surveillance (which is 
the reason why law enforcement is involved). 
 Security engineering process may be applicable to any organization involved in development; in 
particular vehicle manufacturers. 
 Cybersecurity testing and certification is applicable to the automated vehicles because they are 
the object of the testing, but other entities (workshop) may be involved as well. 
 In this specific context, security controls are applicable to entities involved in the product and 
maintenance of automated vehicles. 
 Threat monitoring and reporting involves all the identified roles/entities because each role can 
report on identified vulnerabilities of an AV. Law enforcement is also involved because, law 
enforcers can find out in the field about cybersecurity threats, which impact conformance to 
regulations. 
 Software and hardware integrity mostly involves manufacturers but also the automated vehicle 
itself because techniques could be implemented in the vehicle to make it more robust against 
cybersecurity threat affecting the integrity of its components (e.g., monitoring the integrity of the 
software modules in the ECU). 
 Supply chain integrity mostly affects the AV manufacturer and the supplier of components. 
 Organizational audit mostly impacts organizations involved in the development of the AV, its 
maintenance (workshop) or the applications interfacing with it. 
 Security training and awareness may impact organizations involved in the maintenance of the AV 
(manufacturer, components suppliers or workshop), which may interface to AVs for the 
provision of services (third party providers), to monitor its compliance to road regulations (law 
enforcement) or even drivers/passengers because misuse of the AVs functions can lead to 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities. 
 The process to ensure the testing and calibration capabilities, including the competence of the 
human personnel, is related to workshops.  Manufacturers are also included here because 
manufacturers workshops may be present as well. 
 Software download involves the secure (in terms of integrity) download of the software from the 
manufacturer backend systems to the AV. It may also include download of third party software if 
approved by the AV manufacturer (UNECE 2020b). 
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There are dependencies among the different processes, which are described in the following bulleted list: 
 Risk Management is directly linked to most of the other processes: 
o The identification and definition of risks drives the definition of the tests used for 
verification and validation. It also drives the certification of the AV from the cybersecurity 
point of view. 
o It drives the definition of requirements for the supply chain integrity. For example, it 
drives the definition of the tracking and tracing requirements along the supply chain 
since such requirements are used to mitigate risks that the components of the AV are not 
secure. 
o It drives the definition of the security controls to mitigate risks related to vulnerabilities. 
o It drives the definition of requirements for secure software download in relation to risks 
due to cybersecurity threats impacting the integrity of the download software. 
o It can be used to define the competence of workshops for accurate and complete periodic 
testing and calibration. 
o It shapes requirements for cybersecurity engineering. 
o It drives the definition of requirements for software and hardware integrity to mitigate 
risks related to tampering of software and hardware components in the vehicle. 
o It can impose specifications for the training of personnel to mitigate cybersecurity risks. 
o Risk management is directly linked to organizational audit because the organization 
must prove to an auditor that risks are properly managed. 
 Threat monitoring and reporting 
o This process collects information on new vulnerabilities and threats as a feedback to the 
risk management process. 
o Information of executed threats can be collected by workshops and reported by them if 
they have adequate competence. 
o The collection of information may require vehicle forensics capability which should be 
part of the cybersecurity engineering design. 
 Software and hardware integrity 
o The integrity of software is directly related to the software download process because 
the entire chain of software download and activation must be made secure. 
o The integrity of the hardware is directly related to the supply chain integrity process not 
only from the suppliers to the manufacturer but also to the workshops for parts 
replacement. 
 Organizational audit 
o The audit of the organization can also include the assessment of the security engineering 
processes, supply chain integrity and security training. 
 Testing and calibration in the workshop 
o Testing and calibration in the workshop requires capabilities, which can be obtained with 
adequate training. This is particularly important for cybersecurity aspects, which is a 
new competence area for workshop personnel. 
The development of each of the identified processes implies that these dependencies should be 
addressed, thus the following recommendation: 
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3.3 Cybersecurity testing of AVs 
Testing and certification of autonomous vehicles for cybersecurity aspects is a research area, which can 
include many different elements from other disciplines because AV are in essence cyber physical 
systems where computing platforms (e.g., ECU) can be subject to cybersecurity attacks. Then, the existing 
techniques and research literature in computer security can be adapted to this context as well. On the 
other side, AVs are cyber-physical systems where the output of the algorithms executing in the 
computing platforms hosting the AI algorithms, are used to control a physical object (the AV), which must 
navigate in the road infrastructure without causing harm to its occupants, other vehicles in the road and 
pedestrians. In comparison to conventional computer security, testing for cybersecurity of AV must take 
in consideration the safety hazards, which may derive from cyber physical threats. 
Even if the task of cybersecurity testing and certification of AVs can benefit from techniques and 
approaches from other domains, it still remains a complex task where rigorous processes must be set in 
place not only for the initial deployment of the AV but also during its lifetime as operational conditions may 
change: AVs can benefit from software updates, which can enhance its functions and robustness but also 
sensors and actuators may degrade in time. 
Government, industry and research communities have started to investigate testing and certification of 
cybersecurity requirements in parallel to functional testing of AVs, which is also a very complex task. 
Ideally, cybersecurity testing on AVs should not be performed separately from functional testing but it is 
also true that cybersecurity testing may require a different set of tools and procedures.  In many cases, 
cybersecurity testing of AVs has been considered as an evolution of cybersecurity testing of modern 
vehicles, which have already implemented lower levels of automation for specific functions (ENISA 2019). 
At regulatory level, an important milestone has been reached in June 25, 2020 with the formal approval in 
UNECE GRVA WG29, of two new regulations (UNECE 2020a) and (UNECE 2020b) on automotive 
cybersecurity. In the press release3, UNECE stated that “The two new UN Regulations, adopted yesterday 
by UNECE’s World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations, require that measures should be 
implemented across 4 distinct disciplines: Managing vehicle cyber risks; Securing vehicles by design to 
mitigate risks along the value chain; Detecting and responding to security incidents across vehicle fleet; 
Providing safe and secure software updates and ensuring vehicle safety is not compromised, introducing 
a legal basis for so-called “Over-the-Air” (O.T.A.) updates to on-board vehicle software”. In fact, the two 
new regulations were based on two specific technical reports: the first on testing the cybersecurity of 
automated vehicles and the second on the integrity of the software download function.  The regulations 
are expected to be finalized and published in early 2021 and apply to the 54 contracting parties 
(states/countries, which do not include US or Canada). Once the regulations enter into force, OEMs in the 
member states will be required to implement specific cybersecurity and software-update practices and 
capabilities for Vehicle Type approvals. 
We note that DG.JRC.E.3 substantially contributed to the drafting of these regulations by providing 
contributions, comments and corrections to the draft version of the regulations during the drafting 
meetings. 
Because of the importance of these two new regulations, the following paragraphs describe more in 
detail some of the processes identified in the regulations (they include most of the processes identified in 
Section 3.1). 
                                          
3 http://www.unece.org/info/media/presscurrent-press-h/transport/2020/un-regulations-on-cybersecurity-and-
software-updates-to-pave-the-way-for-mass-roll-out-of-connected-vehicles/doc.html 
Recommendation 1: The design and implementation of the processes required for cybersecurity 
aspects in automated vehicles must take in consideration the dependencies among the processes 
themselves. 
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The following subsection 3.3.1  analyzes UNECE GRVA WG29 regulations on cybersecurity aspects 
(UNECE 2020a) and subsection 3.3.2 analyzes UNECE GRVA WG29 regulation on Software Updates and 
Software Updates Management Systems (UNECE 2020b). 
3.3.1 Analysis of UNECE GRVA WG29 regulation on Cybersecurity and Cyber Security 
Management System 
One key aspect of the regulation (UNECE 2020a) is that it does not describe specific technical details (e.g., 
a specific cryptographic algorithm) but it identifies and defines high level processes to which 
manufacturers and other entities must be compliant. In some specific cases, where additional technical 
details are needed, the regulation delegates their definition to standards (e.g., ISO/SAE 21434). This 
approach is probably based on two main considerations. The first consideration is that cybersecurity 
aspects in AV deal mostly with processes and roles definition rather than the specific technology. The 
second consideration is that technological advancements in AV may trigger regulation obsolescence or 
the need to revise periodically the regulations, which could become a challenging task. Because of the 
dynamic nature of the automotive cyber environment, detailed technical measures could be 
counterproductive. 
The regulation adopts a similar approach to the separation in different process areas described in Section 
3 of this report:  
a) Type Approval of AVs,  
b) set up of processes and audit of the manufacturer. 
The area related to monitoring/market surveillance is described in a limited way in the regulation and it 
mostly focused on the problem to provide software update (in the software OTA regulation) in a secure 
way (i.e., to support the integrity of the software, authentication of the software provider and 
confidentiality of the transmitted data). 
Point a) (Type approval of the AVs) involves actually testing the vehicle and certifying that the design of 
vehicle architecture, the risk assessment procedures, and the implementation of cybersecurity controls 
were executed correctly. In this approval process, an authority tests an individual type of vehicle to check 
if the cybersecurity measures were actually implemented. 
Annex 5 of the regulation provides a list of vulnerabilities or attack methods related to the threats and 
potential mitigation techniques, which shall be considered for risk assessment and mitigations to be 
implemented by vehicle manufacturers. The words “shall be considered” mean that content of Annex 5 is 
not binding but it can be useful for the implementation of the risk assessment.  
Point b) focuses on definition and description of Cyber Security Management Systems (CSMS, the 
namesake of the regulation) and includes cybersecurity requirements for an OEM’s organizational 
structure, processes, and governance. CSMS certification demands evidence (i.e., audit) from the OEM, 
including test reports and threat modeling, in order to prove that due diligence was done in ensuring 
cybersecurity measures throughout the lifecycle of the vehicle. 
Point a) is discussed more in detail in this subsection.  
Point b) is discussed in detail in Section 3.4 
As mentioned before, the support for monitoring and reporting of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and 
attacks is somewhat limited but it is anyway discussed in Section 3.5. of the regulation (UNECE 2020a). 
Vehicle Type requirements detail the various steps a manufacturer must take for Type Approval and then, 
in Sections 8-10 of (UNECE 2020a), the regulation explains that the Vehicle Type approval must be 
maintained throughout the entire lifecycle of the vehicle including the potential modification of vehicles 
and the extension of a vehicle if it impacts the vehicle’s technical performance with respect to 
cybersecurity aspects. It is important to note that in order for an OEM to receive Vehicle Type approval, it 
must first complete the CSMS approval. 
The regulation does not identify a list of binding technical specifications, which must be fulfilled for Type 
Approval, but Section 5 of cybersecurity regulation states that: “Approval Authorities shall grant, as 
appropriate, Type Approval with regard to cyber security, only to such vehicle types that satisfy the 
requirements of this Regulation” and then the requirements areas are specified, which include 
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“Implement  appropriate  cyber  security  measures  in  the  design  of  the  vehicle type” and “Log  data  to  
support  the  detection  of  cyber-attacks  and  provide  data  forensic capability to enable analysis of 
attempted or successful cyber-attacks”. The manufacturer must perform a risk assessment process: 
“(clause 7.3.3. of [1]. The vehicle manufacturer shall identify the critical elements of the vehicle type and 
perform an exhaustive risk assessment for the vehicle type and shall treat/manage the identified risks 
appropriately” and “clause 7.3.4. of (UNECE 2020a).  the vehicle manufacturer shall protect the vehicle 
type against risks identified in the vehicle manufacturer’s risk assessment”. 
As described before, Annex 5 of the regulation (UNECE 2020a) identifies key vulnerabilities, which should 
be used by the manufacturer in their risk assessment process. 
The reported vulnerabilities are similar to vulnerabilities reported in other sources, which analyzed 
cybersecurity threats in modern vehicles (ENISA 2019), (Petit 2014). The list of specific vulnerabilities can 
be classified in the specific following categories: 
 Threats to vehicles regarding their communication channels 
 Threats to vehicles regarding their update procedure 
 Threats to vehicles regarding unintended human actions facilitating a cyber-attack. 
 Threats to vehicles regarding their external connectivity and connections 
 Threats to vehicle data/code 
Vulnerabilities are also listed for the back end servers, which can be used to collect the data from the 
vehicles. 
Mitigation solutions are also proposed to address these threats and vulnerabilities, but it is up to the 
manufacturer to adopt them or not. 
As written before, the regulation does not mandate a specific testing solution. Subsection 3.6 will 
elaborate on the potential testing techniques, which could be implemented. 
 
3.3.2 Analysis of UNECE GRVA WG29 regulations on Software Updates and Software Updates 
Management Systems 
Regulation (UNECE 2020b) provides a framework for the automotive sector to put in place the necessary 
processes for (the following text is extracted from the UNECE web site): 
 Identifying the hardware and software versions, which are legitimate for a vehicle type; 
 Identifying software relevant for Type Approval; 
 Verifying that the software on a vehicle component (e.g., ECU) is what it should be; 
 Identifying interdependencies, especially with regards to software updates; 
 Identifying vehicle targets and verifying their compatibility with a software update; 
 Assessing if a software update affects the Type Approval or legally defined parameters (including 
adding or removing a function). In this context, parameters (e.g., the hyper-parameters of the 
machine learning algorithm used in the visual analysis) are part of the software; 
  Assessing if an update affects safety or safe driving; 
 Informing vehicle owners of updates; 
 Documenting all the above. 
All of these will be audited by national technical services or homologation authorities. 
Software update in (UNECE 2020b) is generally meant as the complete set of operations of software 
download, integrity checking, software activation and reporting on the software update status. 
The Type Approval principles under the 1958 Agreement (UN 1958) mean that manufacturers will need to 
demonstrate, prior to putting vehicles on the market, that they fulfil the following requirements: 
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   The Software Update Management System (SUMS) is in place and its application to vehicles on 
the road is available; 
     Protect Software Update (SU) delivery mechanism and ensure integrity and authenticity; 
     Software identification numbers must be protected; 
     Software identification number is readable from the vehicle; 
For OTA software updates: 
 Restore function if the software update fails for whatever reason; 
 Execute software update only if there is sufficient electric power in the vehicle; 
 Ensure safe execution of the new software version; 
 Inform users (e.g., drivers, passengers) about each software update and about their 
completion status and time; 
 Ensure that the vehicle is in general capable of conducting software updates (e.g., the ECU is 
malfunctioning and it is not able to activate the new software version); 
 Inform user (e.g., drivers, passengers) when a mechanic is needed. Then, a workshop may be 
required to complete successfully the software update. 
As in the case of the regulation on cybersecurity (UNECE 2020b), this regulation provides high level 
requirements and does not specify how the actual tests must be defined. Subsection 3.6 will elaborate on 
the potential testing techniques, 
One key aspect of the software update which has been extensively discussed in other domains beyond 
transportation (see the Cybersecurity Act (EC 2019a)) is the need to implement an efficient software 
testing and certification process to enable the software update of certified software. The main trade-off 
is between the need to fix in the shortest time possible an identified vulnerability in the AVs with the need 
to follow a rigorous process for software testing and update because safety aspects are present in AV. 
For example, a software failure due to a faulty software update in functions related to braking may 
generate critical safety risks. Then, it is important that any software update is subject to an extensive 
regression testing to ensure that the update does not compromise AV functions and in particular AV 
safety functions. Software testing to reach a high level of reliability is not a new research area and the 
aeronautical, defense and space industries have developed sophisticated techniques to implement and 
test software updates (Loyall 1997). On the other hand, these domains have different time scales for 
software deployment and distribution and in many contexts, designers and software developers do not 
have to deal with the complexity of traffic scenarios where a multitude of vehicles are present. This means 
that the testing scenarios in other domains can be considerable less complex than for automated 
vehicles. The software update of the Artificial Intelligence algorithms is particularly important because 
they take the decisions (almost in real-time) on the actions to take during the driving of the AVs (see also 
Section 4).  Note that software updates include both the implementation of the operational functions of 
the AVs and the implementation of the cybersecurity functions (see also Section 3.6). 
The specific context of AV and the challenge to conduct an efficient testing of software updates may 
require an advancement of software testing techniques with specific focus on the testing of artificial 
intelligent algorithms. Advancements in this area will enhance the competitive advantage of the 
European industry on one side and it will improve the safety on the road infrastructure on another side. 
Then, the following recommendation is issued: 
 
 
Recommendation 2: The function of software updates in automated vehicles will require the 
implementation of time efficient software testing processes while maintaining a wide testing 
coverage of the operational scenarios. This report recommends the increase of research in software 
testing for automated vehicles through research funding schemes (Horizon Europe) with a particular 
focus on testing of the artificial intelligence components of the automated vehicle.  
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3.4 Organizational Audit 
One of the critical obligations described in the regulation (UNECE 2020) is that the manufacturer sets up 
a Cyber Security Management System (CSMS). As described in (UNECE 2020), "Cyber Security 
Management System (CSMS) means a systematic risk-based approach defining organizational 
processes, responsibilities and governance to treat risk associated with cyber threats to vehicles and 
protect them from cyber-attacks”. The evidence of the creation and continuous support for the CSMS 
must be proven by the AV manufacturer to the auditor (i.e., the Type Approval authority) to obtain the 
Certificate of Compliance (CoC). 
One important aspect of the CSMS is the implementation of the secure supply chain with clause 7.2.2.5: 
“The  vehicle  manufacturer  shall  be  required  to  demonstrate  how  their  Cyber  Security Management 
System will manage dependencies that may exist with contracted suppliers, service providers or 
manufacturer’s sub-organizations”. 
In addition, while the regulation does not indicate the method by which a vehicle manufacturer must verify 
the cybersecurity of the Tier 1 and 2 components (Tier1 and Tier2 is related to supply chain terminology 
here. For example, Tier1 is the first level of supply to the manufacturer), it demands in Section 5.1.1 of 
(UNECE 2020a) that the vehicle manufacturer must “collect and verify the information required under this 
Regulation through the supply chain so as to demonstrate that supplier-related risks are identified and 
are managed”. 
This means that the vehicle manufacturer must define supply chain processes (e.g., tracking and tracing 
and/or due diligence) to ensure that the supplier provides secure components. 
On the other side, the accreditation of vehicle manufacturers, which are going to implement a CSMS may 
require an update of existing accreditation schemes at European level. Thus the following 
recommendation is proposed. 
 
 
3.5 Cybersecurity Threat Monitoring and reporting 
The regulation (UNECE 2020a) requires the manufacturer to implement monitoring processes (clause 
7.2.2.2(g)). These processes are defined in (UNECE 2020a) with the following description. “The processes 
used to monitor, to detect and respond to cyber-attacks, cyber threats and vulnerabilities on vehicle types 
and the processes used to assess whether the cyber security measures implemented are still effective 
in the light of new cyber threats and vulnerabilities that have been identified”.  The manufacturer must 
also demonstrate that the monitoring process is continual (clause 7.2.2.4): “The vehicle manufacturer 
shall demonstrate that the processes used within their Cyber Security Management System will ensure 
that the monitoring referred to in paragraph 7.2.2.2 (g) shall be continual”. It is also noted that the privacy 
rights must be respected “This capability shall respect paragraph 1.3.  and the privacy rights of car owners 
or drivers, particularly with respect to consent”. 
One aspect that is not described in an exhaustive way is the implementation of the market surveillance 
and the reporting of vulnerabilities and cybersecurity threats. In this context, a process must be set in 
place according to the local regulations where similar approaches are already defined. For example, the 
Cybersecurity Act (EC 2019a) foresees and defines processes for the collection and reporting of 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities in different domains, which may include the automotive sector. Even if no 
decision has been taken to this regard, this report recommends the creation of a vulnerability database 
at European level to report on cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the automotive sector and more 
specifically for AVs. 
One example in the cybersecurity sector is the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
https://nvd.nist.gov/ in USA, which performs a similar function in the USA. 
Recommendation 3: This report recommends to revise the existing accreditation schemes in Europe 
to verify if they are adequate to support the auditing of the Cyber Security Management System (CSMS) 
of automated vehicle manufacturers for the cybersecurity aspects of Type Approval. 
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On the other side, the creation of such a database must take in consideration the challenge to share 
information among stakeholders (e.g., OEM and suppliers) where there is still considerable resistance as 
highlighted in (Morris 2020). Potential approaches based on blockchain may be considered because 
blockchain have been deployed for similar objectives of distributed data integrity and they can be 
implemented with confidentiality solutions in place (Neisse 2020). 
3.6 Potential approaches/techniques for cybersecurity testing of automated vehicles  
This subsection describes the potential approaches for testing, which can be adopted to fulfill the 
regulations (UNECE 2020a) and (UNECE 2020b) and additional regional regulations. 
There are limited studies on the discipline of cybersecurity testing of automated vehicles including the 
testing of security of Over The Air (OTA) software download. In most cases, testing approaches are 
derived from existing approaches from the generic Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
domain but the characteristics of automated vehicles, require a specific effort of customization and 
tailoring. 
We review in this section, contributions and analysis from the most significant resources identified 
through desktop research on cybersecurity testing for vehicles and AV in particular. 
The authors in (Wooderson, 2017) have analyzed and identified the challenges of cybersecurity testing and 
how they are different from functional testing especially in the context of modern vehicles.  The following 
main challenges were identified: 
 While traditional forms of functional testing are typically suitable at revealing the differences 
between the intended behavior and implemented behavior, cybersecurity testing should also 
evaluate what the system should not do. For example, unintentional leakage of sensitive 
information via side channels such as transient power consumption or electromagnetic 
emanations from a microcontroller is a cybersecurity vulnerability even if the microcontroller 
fulfills the functional requirements as expected. 
 It is almost impossible to reach 100% cybersecurity coverage testing because new threats, 
vulnerabilities and attack methods to exploit them are continually discovered and previous 
methods improved upon. Then, cybersecurity testing is a process or set of processes where the 
identification of vulnerabilities must be periodically executed. 
Then, (Wooderson, 2017) identifies the range of activities, which should be part of cybersecurity testing: 
 Vulnerability testing, which has the objective to identify cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the 
vehicle. The identification of the vulnerabilities often requires extensive testing to try different 
combinations of inputs and conditions. Attack trees can be used to implement a structured 
analysis text execution to improve coverage. 
 Penetration testing can be used to address the cases mentioned before to evaluate what the 
system should not do (e.g., side channel information leakage or susceptibility to fault injection 
attacks). In this case, a skilled tester should be employed because the space of all the possible 
attacks is too large for a practical deployment of the product in a reasonable time and the attack 
space should be focused on more probable attacks and attacker can implement. In comparison 
to ICT, penetration testing in automated vehicles can be helped by a proper design of the AV where 
only specific interfaces (i.e., wireless connection) are available to digital world outside the 
vehicle.  Penetration testing could be implemented as black box testing where the internal 
implementation of the system under test is not known by the tester or white box testing where 
the tester has some a-priori knowledge of the system, which can be exploited by the tester to 
anticipate vulnerabilities due to the attacker, who has similar knowledge of the system. 
Recommendation 4: This report recommends to set up a vulnerability database and an associated 
process for the reporting of threats and vulnerabilities in automated vehicles (for all levels of 
automation) at European level. 
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Vulnerability and Penetration Testing’ process steps recommended by SAE J3061 (SAE 2016) can 
be used for this purpose.  
Cybersecurity assessment and certification has a long history in ICT and a number of cybersecurity and 
evaluation schemes have been proposed as discussed in the Cybersecurity Act (EC 2019a) and other 
resources for the IoT domain (Matheu 2019). The Common Criteria certification based on the ISO 15408 is 
one of the most known cybersecurity evaluation processes. It is performed by an independent 
cybersecurity evaluator. While it is well known and mature from the development point of view, it has its 
weaknesses, primarily the high cost associated to the evaluation. We note that Common Criteria was not 
mentioned in the UNECE regulation (UNECE 2020a). On the other side, it has merits, which could not be 
ignored (SAFERTEC 2020). In the text of (UNECE 2020a), no clear standard has been identified and defined 
for this purpose; thus leaving the choice to the vehicle manufacturer. 
Similar types of testing for the cybersecurity of automated vehicle are identified in (Chattopadhyay 2020) 
and they are listed below: 
 Penetration Testing, which is commonly performed as part of a security audit and which can be 
performed as black box or white box as discussed previously in this section. 
 Red Teaming: This is a process for detecting network and system vulnerabilities by assuming the 
role of an attacker, also alternatively termed as ethical hacking. 
 Fuzz Testing, where a wide range of random data is provided as an input to the software/system 
to make it fail with the objective to anticipate attacks in the field 
 Network Testing where the resilience of the in-vehicle network of the AV is evaluated in stress 
conditions to create conditions, which can show vulnerabilities. 
In particular, Fuzz testing is also recommended in (Fowler 2018) as a valuable technique for testing the 
cybersecurity of AV.  
Each of these techniques can be used in the cybersecurity testing but the choice is left to the vehicle 
manufacturers on which technique to use as indicated in (UNECE 2020a). Each testing technique can also 
be used in various phases of the lifecycle of the AV. For example, fuzz testing can be used not only in the 
initial testing and verification before market deployment but also when an update is performed on the AV. 
Another relevant aspect in cybersecurity testing of AV is the definition of a testbed. The definition of such 
a testbed is discussed in (Appel 2020), where it is described the development of a testbed for the 
assurance of safety and security of components with all capabilities from Model-in-loop to Software-in-
loop to Hardware-in-loop testing. The advantage of this testbed is to merge the testing of the safety 
aspects with the security aspects. 
The authors in (Appel 2020) discuss the need to implement specific attack scenarios for the network 
interface both in the in-vehicle interfaces and the external Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to 
Infrastructure (V2I).  The test bed is composed by the CARLA simulator (CARLA 2020) with hardware and 
software components to support an extended test scenario where cybersecurity attacks together with 
functional testing is performed. The paper recognizes that cybersecurity testing is still in a 
growth/starting phase and a harmonized activity on the definition of test bed for cybersecurity testing of 
AVs would be needed. 
We also support a similar conclusion in this report with the additional consideration that standards 
should be developed for the specific AVs domain or customized from other domains. For example, TTCN-
3 has been used to test automotive software (TTCN 2020) and it could also be used for cybersecurity 
purposes. 
Regardless of the choice of the test definition language, this report proposes the following 
recommendation: 
 
 
Recommendation 5: Standardization efforts should be directed to the definition of test bed for 
cybersecurity testing of automated vehicles including the definition of appropriate testing languages. 
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Similar considerations can also be proposed for the testing of software download and integrity even if in 
that case the function is well defined and there is extensive knowledge on testing of software download 
security (e.g., automatic software download in ICT infrastructure or secure software download in 
smartphones). 
In fact, because AVs will be more reliant on software components, the experience in software testing for 
cybersecurity purposes can be re-used for AVs testing and in particular for the OTA software update 
function. The bibliography on this topic is extensive (Wysopal 2006), (Felderer 2016) and it not reported 
here also because some of the techniques have been already identified before (e.g., fuzz testing, 
penetration testing). 
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4 Testing and certification of artificial intelligence in automated vehicles 
This section is focused on the testing and certification of the artificial intelligence algorithms used in 
autonomous vehicles: in particular, the Machine Learning/Deep Learning (ML/DL) algorithms, which are 
used to collect and analyze the surrounding environment (e.g., other vehicles, signs on the road) and 
create the operational awareness, which is essential for the correct functioning of the AVs. 
As described in (Fremont 2020), a defining characteristic of the growth in autonomous vehicles (AVs) and 
automated driving systems (ADS) is the expanding use of ML and other artificial intelligence (AI) based 
components in them. In particular, deep neural networks (DNN)s, have proved to be fairly effective at 
perceptual tasks, such as object detection (e.g., approaching vehicles), classification (e.g., recognition of 
the signs), and image segmentation (e.g., layout of the road infrastructure),  
The main aspects considered in this section are: 
 The role of ML/DL algorithms in autonomous vehicles and the challenge to design effective 
algorithms. 
 Role of the virtual and real testing environment 
 Robustness of ML/DL against adversarial effects. 
 Testing and certification of the AV regarding artificial intelligence. 
 Update of ML/DL algorithms after market deployment. 
Each of these aspects is evaluated for its potential impact on the testing and certification of AVs. If 
challenges and weaknesses are described, each subsection tries to identify and describe potential 
countermeasures. 
4.1 Role of ML/DL algorithm in AVs and ADS 
This subsection focuses on the testing and certification of ML/DL algorithm in AVs and ADS and what 
solutions have been proposed by the government, standardization, industry and research communities. 
One example of tool for the testing of ML/DL algorithms is proposed in (Dreossi 2019) and it is called 
Verifai. 
As described in (Koopman 2016), the proper functioning of the AVs is only possible if the combination of 
perception of the environment and the execution of decisions on the basis of the perceived context 
awareness is done correctly. Without the presence of a driver (level 5 of automation) or even with the 
presence of a driver which is not active in specific situations (level 4 of automation) the objective of the 
ML/DP algorithm is to minimize the error function in determining the proper course of action (e.g. steer in 
one direction to avoid an obstacle).  While there are different types of ML/DL algorithms (supervised, 
unsupervised), one common element among them is inductive learning where the ML/DL creates a 
model, which tries to represent the reality in a faithful way so that actions can be taken accordingly. The 
difference between the prediction of the ML/DL algorithm and the reality (e.g., the ground truth) is the 
error function of the model, which must be minimized. 
There are significant challenges for the implementation of ML/DL in AVs, which must be overcome and 
where the research community is currently focused.  
These challenges are described in the following numbered list and they are relevant to the testing of AVs. 
1. In an ideal situation, the model should represent all the potential situations which an AV could 
face. This goal is almost impossible to achieve unless the AV drives in a controlled environment 
(selected tracks), which is also not realistic. Then, the great part of the research/industry 
community has focused on definition of means to design the model in the most comprehensive 
way possible. This goal has prompted the expansion of the basic controlled track test to 
simulated environments or testing in real traffic conditions with the assumption that full 
coverage of all situations is not possible. Simulated environments for the design and testing of 
ML/DL can be used for this purpose and these aspects are described more in detail in subsection 
4.2. 
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2. ML/DL can also be the subject of attacks to the induction learning design if wrong data is fed to 
the system. This is called Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) where the objective is to inject 
false data to the ML/DL algorithm so that it creates the wrong model. While it can be assumed that 
the pre-deployment is a controlled environment where intentional adversarial machine learning 
is absent (but errors in the creation of the model are still possible), cybersecurity attacks 
including AML can be effective in the field to disrupt the update of the ML/DL algorithms described 
in the previous item 3. Additional details on this aspect are discussed in subsection 4.3. 
3. In comparison to many domains where ML/AI is used, errors in the prediction of the ML/DL 
algorithm can cause safety hazards. Then it is extremely important that the error function is 
minimized, which is again related to the accuracy of the created model described in the previous 
point. The validation of the model is one of the critical aspects in the testing/certification of AVs, 
which is discussed more in detail in subsection 4.4. 
4. Because the full coverage of the scenarios is impossible to achieve in the initial 
design/production phase of AVs, many researchers have proposed the possibility to augment the 
cognitive capabilities of the ML/AI algorithms after-market deployment. This is possible with 
specific ML/DL approaches like Reinforcement Learning (Zhou 2019), (Feng 2020a), (Feng 2020b) 
where the feedback from the field (while the AVs is driving on the road) is used to reinforce the 
initial design of the algorithm (e.g., the weights of the DL algorithm are recalibrated with an 
internal reward mechanism). Other means could be based on advances in the ML/DL design by 
the AV manufacturers, which proceed to perform software updates to the AVs.  Then, the 
software update function must also be tested. Additional details on this aspect are discussed in 
subsection 4.5. 
4.2 Role of the virtual and real testing environment for AI/ML algorithms 
This subsection discusses the role of virtual and real testing environment, the trade-off and balance 
among them and how they can be used for the testing and certification of AVs. 
Real-testing of AVs is a necessary step, which cannot be avoided. We can classify real-testing in two 
separate categories: real-testing in a controlled track and real-testing in a normal traffic environment. 
In the first category (real-testing in a controlled track or track testing), the test environment can be 
controlled to the level that test scenarios can be reproduced with specific conditions including timing, 
position of the vehicle on the road, presence of obstacles and topology of the road.  
The advantage of track testing is its controllability and reproducibility. The disadvantage is the cost of 
setting up the track environment and running the test scenarios. Another obvious disadvantage (derived 
from the previous one) is that not all the driving conditions can be executed. Track testing is not able to 
reproduce all the conditions an autonomous vehicle will face on the road. 
To complement track testing, real testing in a normal traffic environment is often used to test AVs 
prototypes. It has shown its effectiveness to evaluate scenarios or conditions, that were not planned, 
which is its main advantage.  The main disadvantage is the possibility to create hazards to other vehicles 
or humans in the road (e.g. pedestrians). Another disadvantage of real testing in a normal traffic 
environment is that it is not fully reproducible: depending on the traffic conditions, some traffic events 
may happen or not. The third disadvantage is that this type of testing is still not able to provide an extensive 
coverage of testing. As it has been reported in literature (Feng 2020a), AVs should run for hundreds of 
thousands of miles to achieve an almost full coverage of the traffic situations, which is obviously not 
practical.  
Then, virtual testing is used to complement real-testing described above.  Simulation testing can help to 
address the gaps in real-testing identified above. Obviously, simulation cannot be identical to the 
execution in a physical environment: there is always a gap between those two also called the reality gap 
(Jakobi 1995).  
The advantage of the simulation environment is that it can reproduce in a cost effective way a large 
number of driving scenarios. Reproducibility is the key word as the simulation environment is a 
completely controlled environment. In particular, it can simulate different environment conditions (e.g., 
fog, rain), which can negatively impact the perceptiveness of the AVs. Another advantage is that it can be 
implemented in a full machine to machine (M2M) environment without the need of human involvement and 
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which can be easily ported from one simulation environment to another even if the problem of a common 
language must be still resolved in many cases. The main disadvantage is how faithful the simulation 
environment resembles the real environment. In particular, the simulation of the sensors and actuators 
in the vehicle is a key challenge as a model of the vehicle must be faithfully reproduced with all the 
connections and dependencies among the internal components (e.g., powertrain modules, braking 
systems and so on). On the other side, the simulation can be refined and validated by using real data from 
the vehicles. 
From the point of view of the ML/DL design and testing, each of the testing environments described before 
can be used to evaluate the performance of the ML /DL algorithms as discussed in the following bulleted 
list: 
1. Real testing in a controlled environment. The advantage of this type of testing is that the 
environment and the conditions can be controlled and measured. From the ML/DL point of view, 
this means that it is possible to compare the prediction of the ML/DL with the true reality (ground 
truth) during the test. Then, the error function can be measured in a precise way. The 
disadvantage of this type of testing is that only a limited number of scenarios can be tested, which 
means that the ML/DL model is limited and it may be not adapt to the real world conditions or to a 
hostile environment where AML is implemented. This can be mitigated by applying adverse 
conditions in the controlled environment (e.g., introducing adversarial environment conditions) 
but again there is still the problem that the space of adversarial attacks may be limited. 
2. Real testing in a normal traffic environment. The advantage of this type of testing is that the ML/DL 
algorithm is tested in much larger space of contexts and the initial designed model can be widely 
evaluated so that corrections can be introduced. The main disadvantage is that the environment 
is not controlled. Then, it is not possible to reproduce testing conditions and different executions 
of the tests may reproduce different outcomes of the ML/DL algorithm. It is also more difficult 
than in a controlled environment to determine the ground truth as the conditions are not 
controlled even if information on the road conditions can be derived from the recording of the 
sensors installed in the AVs (e.g., camera, Lidar). AVs under test in this environment could be 
equipped with a larger set of sensors than the usual market deployment to collect more useful 
information to determine the ground truth. A final disadvantage of real testing in a normal traffic 
environment is that errors in the ML/DL algorithm prediction can cause safety hazards to 
pedestrian or humans in the AV or other vehicles in the road. 
3. Simulation environment. The advantage of this type of testing is that an extensive set of scenarios 
and conditions can be simulated to evaluate the ML/DL algorithm and its model. This testing 
environment is also called vehicle in the loop. In addition, the ground truth is easy to determine 
(because it is controlled in the simulated environment) and the error functions between 
predictions and ground truth can be easily calculated. Furthermore, various adversarial ML/DL 
scenarios can be implemented by simulating difficult environmental conditions (e.g., fog, slippery 
roads) or obfuscating the signs to confuse the sign recognition system of the AV. The main 
disadvantage is that the definition and reproduction of all the scenarios including the simulation 
of the sensors/actuators of the vehicle is a massive amount of work, which requires significant 
effort even from large industries. A potential way to mitigate this problem would be to define the 
simulation scenarios with a collaborative effort between government and industry. The 
additional benefit of this approach is that the end-result would be a set of simulation testing 
scenarios, which could be used for Type Approval/certification of AVs and which could be defined 
in an impartial way because of the government involvement (see Recommendation 6 below).  
A disadvantage of this testing environment is that the real components like sensors and 
actuators must be simulated properly. In particular, their performance must be evaluated 
because the timing of the chain of decision->action between the ML/DL algorithm decision output 
and the execution of the identified action in the actuators of the AVs (i.e., brakes) must be faithful 
to the real AVs conditions. In this context, special considerations should be taken to simulate the 
potential physical degradations of the actuators components in the vehicle due to their usage and 
time. While a human driver may have an intuitive perception that the condition of the vehicle are 
not optimal (and the conditions of the vehicle are anyway usually checked in the periodic 
mandatory inspections), the advance in automotive sensors can provide an improvement and 
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feed the ML/DL with up-to-date information on the conditions of the sensors and actuators in the 
AV.  
To summarize this analysis, each of the testing environments has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
Then, an initial recommendation is to include all the different environments for the Type 
Approval/certification of AVs. 
 
 
In addition, while it is recommended that each type of testing should be based on a harmonized set of tests, 
this aspect is particularly important for the testing in the simulation environment because of the huge 
effort needed to set-up a comprehensive set of tests and the need to have the impartiality of these tests. 
Testing in a normal traffic environment cannot be controlled a priori which makes the harmonization 
difficult and real testing in a controlled environment could be executed in specialized AV manufacturer 
facilities. The definition of such comprehensive set of scenarios is also linked to the creation of the 
scenario database described in Section 5. 
Thus the following recommendation. 
 
Recommendation 6: Type approval/certification of the Artificial Intelligence components of the AV 
should include real testing in a controlled environment, real testing in a normal traffic environment 
and testing in a simulation environment. The simulation environment should be able to reproduce the 
realistic conditions of a vehicle including the possible degradation of its physical components (e.g., 
actuators, sensors). 
Recommendation 7: A government/industry partnership should be set up for the definition of a 
simulated testing environment and a common set of simulated testing scenarios based on a common 
language and a defined set of outcomes. 
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4.3 Robustness of ML/DL against adversarial effects in autonomous vehicles 
This subsection discusses a potential weakness of the ML/DL in its application to AVs. ML and more 
specifically DL, which has been demonstrated (Papernot 2016), (McDaniel 2016) to be vulnerable to 
adversarial effects, like the injection of false data to confuse the ML/DL trained algorithm. In the context 
of classification (which is one of the main tasks of ML/DL in AV as they need to classify and discriminate 
different objects in the road infrastructure), adversarial samples are crafted to force a target model to 
classify them in a class different from their legitimate class (McDaniel 2016). For example, a speed limit 
sign could be classified with a different speed limit. 
The reason of this weakness has been demonstrated in various experiments (Huang 2011), in particular 
for Deep Learning (DL) and the processing of images (Papernot 2016), which is performed by a camera 
and it is an essential element of the AVs sensor equipment. This weakness is relevant for all the machine 
learning algorithms but in particular for deep learning. It consists in feeding the ML/DL algorithm with 
false or confusing information to create or update a model, which is altered and which could perform in a 
non-correct way while driving in the road infrastructure. There are numerous examples from literature. 
In (Biggio 2018) and (Arkar 2017), are mentioned examples of AML where the false image of a sign was 
captured by the camera of an AV. 
An extensive review on AML in AVs and potential mitigation measures is provided in (Qayyum 2020) and 
the key findings are reported here: 
 AML can affect all the main cognitive functions of an AV: perception, prediction, planning and 
decision making but attacks to some cognitive functions of AV like planning and decision require 
the access to in-vehicle components and systems, which may be difficult to implement. Then, 
most of the listed attacks in literature are related to perception of the environment and detection. 
 Based   on   the   adversarial knowledge available to the adversaries, attacks can be divided into 
three types; white-box, gray-box, and black-box attacks. White-box attacks assume a complete 
knowledge about the underlying ML/DL model, including parameters optimization, weights and 
so on gray box attacks assume some knowledge of the ML/DL model like the ML algorithm. A 
black box attack refers to the real-world knowledge where there is not much information 
available to the attacker about the targeted ML/DL scheme. 
 It could be difficult to differentiate between intentional adversarial attacks (cybersecurity 
threats) and unintentional failures. For example, in 2016 a Tesla autopilot was not able to handle 
the image contrast between the bright sky and a white truck which resulted in the death of the 
human tester (Guardian 2016). 
There is the need to make more robust the ML/DL algorithms in AVs. Various sources (Qayyum 2020), 
(Goodfellow 2018), (Brendel 2017) have identified approaches to make the ML/DL more robust against 
AML. Potential techniques are identified in the following list: 
 Training with adversarial examples the ML/DL model can make it more robust against the 
specific examples inserted in the training. The problem is that it is usually not possible to foresee 
in advance what type of adversarial examples should be adopted. 
 A mitigation technique can be based on the observation that input feature spaces are typically 
unnecessarily large and provide a vast room for an adversary to construct adversarial 
perturbations. Then, ML/DL algorithms can be made more robust by proposing feature squeezing 
as  a  defense  strategy  to  adversarial  examples (Xu 2018). 
 A similar approach to the previous point is to select specific features, which are particularly 
robust against AML and use only these features in the classification either by inserting a 
selection filter or by using only a subset of features. 
 The input data space can be transformed in a new space (e.g., using a manifold) to make the data 
model more robust against AML. Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) can also be used for 
cleaning adversarial perturbations. 
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 Create additional and complementary models to enhance the robustness of the main model used 
by the AV. For example, the authors in (Goodfellow 2014) proposed an ensemble training that 
works by assembling multiple instances of the original DL models. 
 The recent studies on federated learning can also improve the robustness of the models used in 
the ML/DL algorithms by collecting information from different ML/DL components from different 
vehicles. The application of federated learning to automated vehicles is still in its infancy, but it 
could be explored further (Pokhrel 2020). 
 
To mitigate the criticality of AML to AV, it should be also noted that some AML attacks imply anyway the 
access to the data input to the AI components in the AV (e.g., data from sensors to AI components). Then, 
cybersecurity mitigation techniques focused on restricting the access to the interfaces or the in-vehicle 
network of the AV could also improve the robustness of the AV against AML. 
To summarize, AML attacks in AVs are possible at different phases (e.g., detection, decision) of the 
cognitive engine of the AVs and AVs should be protected against this type of attacks or at least some of the 
mitigation techniques identified above should be included in the design and update of the ML/DL. Then the 
following recommendation is proposed: 
 
  
 
4.4 Testing and certification of the AV regarding Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
The modern evolution of automotive vehicles to increasing levels of autonomy will also make them more 
dependent on the software, which is not only limited to the software implementation of AI functions (i.e., 
generally implemented by ML/DL algorithms) but it also includes the software of other computing 
platforms in the vehicle like the Electronic Control Units (ECU). 
Testing and certification of the AI component in the AVs is part of the overall testing of the AV, which is 
extensively discussed in sections 2 and 5. In this subsection, we discuss the main aspects related to the 
AI component. 
The following key points are identified: 
 Testing of AI in AV has similar challenges to the testing of AI in other domains (e.g., image 
processing, cybersecurity). In particular, as discussed in (Koopman 2016), the creation of 
scenarios and labelled sets for the validation of the AI models can require significant effort 
considering the variety of scenarios an AV can face. The labelling effort usually requires human 
action but it could be automatized in some contexts. For example, the labelling could be part of 
the definition of a simulated environment scenario. 
 As discussed in the previous subsection 4.3, the robustness of the ML/DL algorithms in the AI 
element of the AV must be tested. One potential approach is to augment the testing scenarios with 
variations of the basic data set as suggested in (Tian 2018), where the authors proposes a testing 
methodology based on two main elements. The first element is to increase the testing coverage 
with synthetic images, which are variation of the initial scenario where images are obfuscated 
with noise, scaled translated or rotated. The second element is specific to neural networks and it 
is targeted to implement extended neurons coverage and create testing inputs, which are able to 
stimulate as many neurons as possible of the neural networks implemented in the AI of the AV. 
The authors in (Tian 2018), show that many “corner cases” which can lead to safety hazards are 
discovered through their testing framework.  The limitations of this approach is that neurons 
coverage is usually designed for specific DL algorithms like Convolutional Neural Networks 
(CNN) or Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) and its application requires anyway significant 
testing effort. 
Recommendation 8: Design of the Machine Learning/Deep Learning algorithms in automated vehicles 
should include mitigation techniques against adversary machine learning. 
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 As with the overall testing of AVs, an optimization algorithm can be implemented to identify the 
most relevant tests. An optimization algorithm is proposed in (Feng 2020a) and (Feng 2020b). In 
another study, the authors have used evolutionary algorithms to restrict the subset of specific 
testing scenarios (Klischat 2019). Even with these recent and promising results, the definition of 
the optimization algorithm can be quite complex and further research is needed in this area (see 
recommendation at the end of this subsection). 
 Due to the complexity of AI and the width of the scenario space in AV, another approach is to 
perform tests in the different phases of the development cycle. In addition, specific functions of 
the ML/DL can be tested with appropriate testing scenarios. This “divide and impera” approach is 
proposed and described in detail in (Vishnukumar 2017). 
To summarize, testing of the AI components in AV share many similarities to testing of AI in general but 
there are specific aspects related to the AVs scenarios and the development cycle of the AVs, which must 
be taken in consideration. Even if promising studies and results have been proposed, it is noticed that 
most of the studies are quite recent. In addition, testing for AML is still in the early phase and this would 
require more effort by the research and industry community. Thus the following recommendation is 
provided. 
 
 
 
4.5 Lifecycle of AVs: update of ML/DL algorithms aftermarket deployment 
Beyond the initial testing of the ML/DL algorithms in the AV as part of the Type Approval process or similar 
Validation and Verification processes, it is expected that AVs will have the capability to be updateable in 
software during their deployment lifecycle. This assumption is supported by various sources, in 
particular (UNECE 2020b), which describes the Over The Air (OTA) software update requirements and the 
related Type Approval process.  The content of (UNECE 2020b) was already discussed in detail in 
subsection 3.3.2 and its analysis will not be repeated here.  
(UNECE 2020b) and other sources (Halder 2020) discuss in details the operational requirements for OTA 
software update in AVs, but these studies are generic for all the software components in the AV, while this 
subsection discusses instead the impact on the testing of the AI component in the AVs when only the AI 
software is updated. 
As in the previous sections, the key points are discussed in the bulleted list below. Then a summary of the 
key points is provided and a recommendation is issued. 
 Software update in the case of ML/DL algorithms does include not only the update of the software 
(e.g., the software for a full new algorithm) but also the update of the hyper parameters of the 
ML/DL algorithms (e.g., C parameter in the SVM algorithm) or the weights in a neural network. In 
both cases, the integrity of the transmitted information should be preserved Over The Air (OTA), 
but the update design could be slightly different also because the size of the hyper parameters 
can be less than a full software package. 
 It can be assumed (UNECE 2020a) that the computing platform hosting the ML/DL algorithms has 
specific requirements for protection (e.g., physical security) and anti-tampering because such 
algorithms implement the essential cognitive capabilities of an AV. Then, the secure OTA for the 
ML/DL algorithms should have an even higher level of security than the OTA for the AV. 
Recommendation 9: There is the need to expand the research efforts for the testing of Artificial 
Intelligence components (e.g., Machine Learning/Deep Learning) in automated vehicles with specific 
focus on the optimization of the test cases, application of testing activities in different phases of the 
development lifecycle and testing for Artificial Intelligence robustness against adversary machine 
learning. It is also recommended that research outputs should be standardized to support 
harmonized testing of AVs. 
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 As in the case of general AV software updates, a critical aspect is the re-evaluation of the ML/DL 
algorithms before deployment. The re-evaluation should include a regression testing to evaluate 
not only the updated parts of the code and the new functions (e.g., image analysis) but all the 
existing functions. Because the ML/DL software is part of the overall AVs software, it should also 
be conformant to the Type Approval process defined in (UNECE 2020b) and/or current or future 
regional requirements (e.g., EU regulations on type approval). 
 ML/DL algorithms are heavily dependent on the quality of the data, which is provided as an input. 
In the initial Type Approval phase, the ML/DL algorithms are tested against the data from the 
sensors (e.g., camera) installed in the vehicle. The operational status of these sensors in this 
initial Type Approval phase can be assumed to be quite high. Once the vehicle is deployed, the 
quality of the sensors and the related data may degrade, which may introduce errors in the 
cognitive functions of the ML/DL algorithms. Such degradation can be compensated by frequent 
calibration checks at the workshop or it can be mitigated by the ML/DL algorithm itself if the 
degradation factor is known. This function could be improved if the automated vehicle 
periodically sends information to the manufacturer systems (e.g., cloud or other backend 
systems) to inform them about the status of the AV and its sensors/actuators. This is called 
predictive maintenance, which is not a recent concept, but it should be adapted to AV. See (Machin 
2019) for a recent analysis on predictive maintenance in the automotive sector. Then, the 
manufacturers can send back to the ML/DL algorithms a new set of calibration factors, which can 
mitigate the degradation of the sensors within certain limits. This is also a form of software 
update, which must be addressed. 
 
To summarize: while the OTA software update in AV has received considerable attention in recent times 
and requirements and functions are being defined both in regulatory and standardization bodies, the 
software update of the ML/DL algorithms require specific measures, which must be defined and adopted. 
This aspect has not received enough attention by the research and industry community. Thus, the 
following recommendation is issued: 
 
 
  
Recommendation 10: Specific measures must be defined and adopted for the Over The Air (OTA) 
software update of the Machine Learning/Deep Learning algorithms in Autonomous Vehicles. 
Software update in this context may also mean update of the Machine Learning/Deep Learning hyper-
parameters.   
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5 Scenarios for testing and certification of automated vehicles 
The aim of this section is to describe the processes to create the scenarios for testing and certification of 
automated vehicles. This set of scenarios may include both real and virtual test scenarios and do also 
include specific scenarios to test cybersecurity attacks or ML/DL as described in the previous sections. 
The following subsections will be part of the analysis: 
● Language to define the scenarios for testing and certification. Relationship between set of 
testing scenarios and Type Approval. 
● Role of real and virtual testing. 
● Metrics of evaluation related to the scenario definition. 
● Definition of a potential scenario database. 
● Scenario lifecycle and process to update the scenarios from real operational conditions 
including market surveillance. 
In this report, we use the definition of scenario from (Ulbrich 2015). 
“A scenario describes the temporal development between several scenes in a sequence of scenes. Every 
scenario starts with an initial scene. Actions & events as well as goals & values may be specified to 
characterize this temporal development in a scenario. Other than a scene, a scenario spans a certain 
amount of time.” 
5.1 Scenario language 
This subsection discusses the language to define the scenarios for testing and certification. Because, 
testing and certification of AVs is going to be a complex process with many different variables, it is 
important to define a language, which is able to represent without ambiguities all the complex variables 
present in a testing scenario and be comprehensive enough to address all the potential scenarios. A 
major limitation of current tools is the lack of programmability of test environments. 
As discussed in (Queiroz 2019), engineers working on the definition of testing scenarios need to learn 
tool-specific languages or program simulated traffic from scratch due to large variety of simulation tools 
for testing of AVs. Migrating scenarios between different simulation tools requires extra effort and 
impairs comparisons between different driving systems. 
In the following paragraphs, we provide an overview of the main languages for the definition of testing 
scenarios for AVs. 
Note that there are also testing toolkits to generate tests for AVs like the one described in (OAS 2020). 
Table 3 Languages for testing scenarios of automated vehicles 
Measurable 
Scenario Description 
Language (M-SDL) 
The Measurable Scenario Description Language (M-SDL) is a recent higher-
level DSL similar to SCENIC, which precedes its definition; while M-SDL is 
more specialized for AV testing, it has less support than SCENIC for 
probabilistic and geometric modeling and is not supported by open-source 
back-end tools for verification, debugging, and synthesis of autonomous AI/ML 
based systems. M-SDL is described in Foretellix, Inc. (2020) Measurable 
Scenario Description Language. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.foretellix.com/open-language/. 
GeoScenario GeoScenario is a somewhat higher-level domain specific language (DSL) for 
scenario representation, whose syntax also looks like XML. (Queiroz 2019) 
SCENIC SCENIC is a flexible high-level language that is complementary to 
OpenScenario. (Freemont 2019). SCENIC can be complemented by the 
opensource VERIFAI toolkit for Machine Learning/Artificial Intelligence. 
VERIFAI is described in (Dreossi 2019). 
 
39 
OpenScenario and 
Open Drive 
https://www.asam.net/  
Simulation standards: OpenDrive 
(https://www.asam.net/standards/detail/opendrive/), OpenScenario 
(https://www.asam.net/standards/detail/openscenario/) 
OpenScenario is of widespread use among stakeholders for the scenario 
description, and is also adopted by initiatives related to Database development 
(e.g. by France, UK) 
ASAM took over work done by PEGASUS on that: see also PEGAUS Project 
(PEGASUS 2020). 
PARACOSM Paracosm is a reactive language introduced by (Majumdar 2019) for writing 
test scenarios for AVs. Paracosm allows users to programmatically describe 
complex driving situations with specific visual features as well as reactive 
temporal behaviors of cars and pedestrians. Paracosm programs are 
executed on top of a game engine that provides realistic physics simulation and 
visual rendering. The infrastructure allows systematic exploration of the state 
space, both for visual features, environmental conditions (lighting, shadows, 
fog) and for reactive interactions with the environment (pedestrians, presence 
of approaching vehicles, etc). 
CrisGen The authors in (Nonnengart 2019) introduce a novel formal method-based 
approach CriSGen for an automated and complete generation of critical trac 
scenarios for virtual training of self-driving cars. 
 
 
5.2 Real and virtual testing of AV 
Testing of AVs can be implemented either in a real environment, a simulated/virtual environment or even 
a combination of both: 
 Real environment testing is the one currently adopted in the automotive industry where vehicles 
are submitted to driving test conditions either in a specialized track environment which can be 
controlled by the testers (e.g., to introduce special conditions like obstacles) or in real traffic 
conditions, which can reproduce more faithfully the conditions when the vehicle is deployed in 
the market but which cannot be controlled by the tester. 
 Simulated environment is where the computing platform of the AV is subject to a virtual 
simulation, to evaluate the response of the AVs processing functions and its sensors or actuators 
if they are also part of the simulated environment test. In comparison to the real environment 
testing, the simulated environment can widen the set of conditions defined by the testers but 
there is the risk that realistic conditions are not reproduced in a complete way. 
 Mixed reality test drive (MRTD) is a combination of the two type of testing approaches described 
above. It uses real environmental conditions of real test drives and the accuracy and 
reproducibility of virtual test drive vehicle behavior descriptions (scenarios). An example of 
MRTD is described in (Heinz 2017) where OpenScenario is used as a scenario language. 
5.3  Evaluation metrics for scenario language definition. 
This subsection discusses the potential metrics for the evaluation of the scenario languages (to 
understand which language would be preferable and/or adopted),  
A proposal for the evaluation of scenario languages is suggested in (Queiroz 2019), where the authors 
identify the following basic principles (the following text is extracted from (Queiroz 2019)): 
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1. Reuse: Leverage existing open formats to build a new language on top of well-known and used 
structures. With this approach, existing tools can be reused to support our new language with 
only minor adjustments.  
2. Simplicity: The language is simple enough to be human readable when simple scenarios are 
modeled. Tools are encouraged to support complex scenarios.  
3. Coverage: It is able to express the main components of a scenario.  
4.  Extensibility: It can be easily extended with new features and specializations of its standard 
components.  
5. System independence: It supports test cases for different AV designs, operating on different 
levels of automation.  
6. Tool independence: It can be interpreted and executed by alternative simulation and test 
environments.  
7. Executability: It can express concrete scenarios that can run in simulation environment without 
the need of additional steps or software modules. For example, a scenario does not need the 
addition of a software module implementing a machine learning algorithm to execute. 
Another important consideration can be derived from (SAE 2018) that states: “Some of the technologies 
used in autonomous vehicles are inherently statistical in nature. In general, they tend to be non-
deterministic (non-repeatable), and may give answers that are only correct to some probability – if a 
probability can be assigned at all. Validating such systems presents challenges not typically found in 
more deterministic, conventional automotive control systems”. One of the reasons is that the cognitive 
process to understand the context and take an action is implemented in the vehicle rather than by the 
human. Because the human driver response can vary in the human driver population when executing a 
specific driving scenario, the same consideration can be applied to an AV as the cognitive algorithms 
outcome may vary from model to model or from slight variations in the scenario (e.g., presence of varying 
degrees of visibility due to rain, fog or darkness). 
One of the outcomes of the consideration above is that evaluation metrics for a scenario execution may 
not be an exact pass/fail criterion but it can also provide a statistical indicator on how a scenario was 
passed. For example, an AV may not always provide the same outcome in a test track testing scenario 
especially when all the conditions may not be fully reproducible. On the other side, the desired outcome 
of the testing and the AV deployment is to reach almost 100% or 100% statistical probability success 
especially when safety aspects are present (e.g., avoid a pedestrian). This aspect of testing of AV is 
discussed in detail in (ADAPTIVE 2015) where statistical tools, which can be applied to AV testing, are 
identified and described. 
5.4 Definition of a potential scenario database 
This subsection discusses the definition of a scenario database and describes the key components 
including the identification of relevant activities (i.e., creation of a database) in this domain. 
5.4.1 Scenarios Filtering 
One initial consideration for the definition of a database scenario is that highly automated systems and 
AVs in particular are typically highly-dimensional systems with continuous dynamics interacting with 
complex and unpredictable environments. Therefore, it is not possible to exhaustively cover this infinite 
state-space with a finite (and sufficiently small) number of tests (ENABLE 2019). 
This means that we need a criterion to define and select relevant tests for the overall Type 
Approval/Certification of AV types (UoM 2020). If not all the available scenarios can be part of the Type 
Approval/Certification, a sub-selection of scenarios can be filtered from the overall set on the basis of 
specific metrics/criteria like: 
1. Consistency with reality: A scenario could be consistent with real situations, so that its 
application to the Type Approval of automated vehicles is justified. For example, the test scenario 
parameters ideally should be selected based on naturalistic road user data (see (UoM 2020) for 
an extensive discussion on this aspect). 
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2. Requirements traceability. A scenario could be easy to trace to high level requirements for the 
functioning of the specific AV type. Then, a scenario could be preferable to another if it addresses 
a greater part of requirements or in a more complete way. 
3. Criticality: This metric evaluates the scenario based on its relevance to critical situations like a 
vehicle accident or a near miss situation. 
4.  Cost and complexity. This metric evaluates the cost and the complexity of the scenario execution. 
5. Relation to the operational context of the AV. This metric evaluates how relevant is the scenario 
to the operational context for which the AV has been designed. For example, the operational 
context of a commercial vehicle is different from a passenger vehicles or the operational context 
is different for vehicle with a level of automation equal to 4 instead of 5 (see (SAE 2016a) for a 
description of the levels of automation). 
These are only examples of possible criteria/metrics. More work is needed to identify potential criteria 
and metrics, which can be used to filter and select scenarios for specific contexts, thus the following 
recommendation. 
 
 
 
5.4.2 Scenarios Classification 
An important functionality of the database is the capability to classify scenarios along different 
dimensions. This is different from the definition of criteria/metrics for the selection of adequate scenarios 
discussed in the previous subsection but it is focused on how the scenarios should be stored in the 
scenario database and which categories or classification dimensions can be used for their classification.  
This would help the task of searching of scenarios from the scenario database. 
The following categories are proposed at this stage:  
1. Virtual/Track/Real/Mixed Reality. If the scenario must be executed in a virtual, track test site, real 
or mixed reality context. 
2. Autonomous Vehicle category. To which category of autonomous vehicle the scenario should be 
applied. For example, a scenario could only be applied to commercial vehicles or passenger 
vehicles or both. 
3. Level of automation. To which level of automation the scenario refers. 
4. Repeatability.  If a scenario must be executed a number of times rather than only one. 
5. Requirements area traceability. This dimension indicates to which requirements area (or areas) 
the scenario refers. 
6. Regulation. If a scenario is defined in relation to a specific regulation. 
7. Dependencies. This dimension is used to describe the dependencies of one scenario on other 
scenarios. 
8. Criticality. This dimension indicates if the scenario is related to a critical situation or a hazardous 
situation. This can also be related to the concept that scenario may be impossible to achieve 
because there is not time for the AV to reach (e.g., to avoid a pedestrian) or possible. See (UoM 
2020) for further discussions on this aspect. 
9. Sensitivity. If the test scenario contains sensitive information.  
Recommendation 11: Because the number of possible scenarios for testing AVs can be unbounded and 
it can also vary depending on the operational context of the AV (e.g., commercial vehicle, passenger 
vehicle), it is important to define selection criteria to identify a limited but still suitable set of test 
scenarios.  Additional research efforts are needed in this area. 
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10. Formal definition. If the test scenario is defined in a formal way, semi-formal, or informal 
notation. Formal or semi-formal are preferable. 
In addition, all scenarios shall include (ISO 26262) the parameter ranges of the state values used for 
scenario representation and scenarios shall provide a formal notation for the representation of the 
parameter ranges (for example a data format) to enable an automated processing 
Additional information on scenarios definition and their attributes is available from ISO 26262 and some 
ambiguities in relation to this aspect are discussed in (Menzel 2018).  To resolve such ambiguities, the 
authors have defined three different categories of scenario (extracted from (Menzel 2018)): 
 Functional scenarios include operating scenarios on a semantic level. The entities of the domain 
and the relations of those entities are described via a linguistic scenario notation.  The scenarios 
are consistent.  The vocabulary used for the description of functional scenarios is specific for the 
use case and the domain and it can include different levels of detail. 
 Logical scenarios include operating scenarios on a state space level. Logical scenarios 
represent the entities and the relations of those entities with the help of parameter ranges in the 
state space.  The parameter ranges can optionally be specified with probability distributions.  
Additionally, the relations of the parameter ranges can optionally be specified with the help of 
correlations or numeric conditions. A logical scenario includes a formal notation of the scenario. 
 Concrete scenarios distinctly depict operating scenarios on a state space level. Concrete 
scenarios represent entities and the relations of those entities with the help of concrete values 
for each parameter in the state space. 
5.4.3 Desirable qualities for a Scenario Database  
This subsection describes the desirable qualities and requirements for a scenario database. This is not to 
be confused with the criteria/metrics for the scenario selection and classification discussed in the 
previous sub-sections. 
The following requirements are defined:  
1. Access control with defined roles to limit the access of unauthorized users to sensitive content 
and scenarios. 
2. Capability to store the scenario parameters range of values together with the scenario itself. 
3. Capability to translate scenarios from other databases and other formats. 
4. Preserve the integrity of scenarios records. 
5. Support the traceability of requirements, scenarios and results. 
6. Possibility to update the scenarios format and content. 
7. Powerful searching capabilities to identify relevant scenarios based on metadata of the scenario. 
 
5.4.4 A list of existing scenario databases 
The scenario database is a data storage area (central or distributed) for storing the scenarios and their 
associated metadata including the range of the parameters, used in the scenario. There are already 
similar scenario databases in other contexts. 
For example, in the aviation, maritime and railway sectors, the European Coordination Centre for 
Accident and Incident Reporting Systems (ECCAIRS) database exists, developed by the JRC and already 
used within aviation, maritime and railway sectors worldwide (EC 2020a). 
In the sector of testing of automated vehicles, we have various examples of projects, whose goal is to set 
up a scenario database. 
In Germany, the project PEGASUS (Project for the Establishment of Generally Accepted quality criteria, 
tools and methods as well as Scenarios and Situations) has the goal to develop a generally accepted and 
standardized procedure, for the testing and approval of automated driving functions to facilitate the rapid 
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implementation of automated driving into practice. The description of the scenarios is based on the 
OpenDRIVE and OpenSCENARIO (PEGASUS 2020). 
 In UK, the MUSICC project (UK DoT 2020) has defined a Multi-User Scenario Catalogue for CAVs, which 
has the objective to: 
 Create a standard language to describe scenarios 
 Build an open and extensible library of scenarios for CAV certification 
 Focus on simulation testing environment 
A functional prototype system has been built and is undergoing user trials with interested stakeholders. 
The scenario database language is OPENSCENARIO. The timeframe is for a full deployment for the end of 
2022. 
In France, the MOSAR (Méthodes et Outils pour la conception et la validation de Systèmes Autonomes 
Robustes) defines scenarios libraries for AV design and validation. 
In Sweden, the DRIVE SWEDEN project is a strategic Innovation Program (SIP) that focuses on creating a 
mobility system of the future for people and gods that are sustainable, safe and accessible for all. The 
program is funded by the Swedish Energy Agency, the Swedish Research Council Formas and Sweden’s 
innovation agency VINNOVA. In the context of the DRIVE SWEDEN project, there is an activity of the 
creation of a scenario database for testing of automated vehicles. 
The list is not exhaustive and a more detailed description is provided in (Galassi 2020a) and (Galassi 
2020b). 
As shown in the examples above, there are different database scenarios, which could generate a 
fragmentation of test scenarios across jurisdictions: national or regional. A public-private partnership 
could be set up to define a common scenario database to be used as a reference framework for Type 
Approval activities. The scenario database includes the processes to define a scenario language, the 
methodology to create and apply scenarios and to improve the scenarios on the basis of market 
surveillance. 
 
 
5.5 Processes for the scenario database  
We can identify three main processes for the scenario databases: 
1. Definition of the scenarios from the initial requirements 
2. Application of scenarios definition to testing 
3. Update of scenarios definition from feedback received from the field after market deployment 
(market surveillance). 
For the first two processes, PEGASUS project has defined an extensive framework, which is described in 
Figure 3 and Figure 5. We refer to the PEGASUS project at https://www.pegasusprojekt.de/en/ (PEGASUS 
2020) for an additional description of these processes. 
 
Recommendation 12: A public-private partnership could be set-up to design, develop and deploy a 
scenario database for Type Approval of automated vehicles. The scenario database includes the 
processes to define a scenario language, methodology to create and apply scenarios and to improve 
the scenarios on the basis of market surveillance. 
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Figure 5 Database data process chain (from PEGASUS project (PEGASUS 2020)) 
Even if it is acknowledged that the PEGASUS project has performed an admirable effort in the definition 
of processes for the creation of a scenario database, the results from the PEGASUS project must be 
further assessed with similar initiatives to create a harmonized set of processes for the creation and 
maintenance of the database scenario for testing of AVs. Thus, the following recommendation is provided, 
which is linked to Recommendations 12 and 14. 
 
 
The third process must be defined but the following considerations can be put forward: 
1. It must be decided which parties are responsible to collect the data from market surveillance 
which can be used an input and feedback to the scenario generation process and update.  
2. The format to collect the data for market surveillance must be decided. 
3. It is must be decided who is responsible to update the scenarios on the basis of the collected data. 
It could be assumed that the responsible are the same, who drafted the initial scenarios. 
4. Because of different jurisdictions in Europe, the data may be collected by different entities. 
Interoperability and well defined channels to report information must be defined. 
5. The role of vehicle manufacturers, law enforcers and consumers’ associations must be defined. 
Each organization have different knowledge, rights and obligations in the automotive domain. 
Each of these stakeholders may have different access rights to access the scenario database. 
  
Recommendation 14: A process for collection of data used to update existing scenarios must be 
defined with a clear definition of roles for the main stakeholders in the automated vehicle domain (e.g., 
manufacturers, law enforcers and consumers’ associations). 
Recommendation 13: The results from the PEGAGUS project must be evaluated by an impartial 
committee to decide which elements can be included in a European wide scenario database 
framework for the testing of AVs. 
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6 Recommendations 
The purpose of this section is to summarize the recommendations, which were initially presented in the 
previous sections of the report. Each recommendation is related to a specific area: update of regulatory 
framework, standardization activities, guideline for the industry or research opportunity. 
 
6.1 Summary table of the recommendations  
 
Table 4 Summary of the recommendations of this report 
Identifier Recommendation description Area 
1 The design and implementation of the processes required for 
cybersecurity aspects in automated vehicles must take in 
consideration the dependencies among the processes 
themselves. 
Regulation, industry, 
research 
2 The function of software update in automated vehicles will 
require the implementation of time efficient software testing 
processes while maintaining a wide testing coverage of the 
operational scenarios. This report recommends the increase 
of research efforts in software testing for automated 
vehicles through research funding schemes (Horizon 
Europe) with a particular focus on testing of the artificial 
intelligence components of the automated vehicle. 
Standardization, 
research 
3 This report recommends to revise the existing accreditation 
schemes in Europe to verify if they are adequate to support 
the auditing of the Cyber Security Management System 
(CSMS) of automated vehicle manufacturers for the 
cybersecurity aspects of Type Approval. 
Regulation, 
standardization 
4 This report recommends to set up a vulnerability database 
and an associated process for the reporting of threats and 
vulnerabilities in automated vehicles (for all levels of 
automation) at European level. 
Regulation 
5 Standardization efforts should be directed to the definition of 
test bed for cybersecurity testing of automated vehicles 
including the definition of appropriate testing languages. 
Standardization 
6 Type approval/certification of the Artificial Intelligence 
components of the AV should include real testing in a 
controlled environment, real testing in a normal traffic 
environment and testing in a simulation environment. 
Regulation, 
standardization, 
research 
7 A government/industry partnership should be set up for the 
definition of a simulated testing environment and a common 
set of simulated testing scenarios based on a common 
language and a defined set of outcomes. 
Regulation, industry  
8 The design of the Machine Learning/Deep Learning 
algorithms in automated vehicles should include mitigation 
techniques against adversary machine learning. 
Industry, research 
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9 There is the need to expand the research efforts for the 
testing of Artificial Intelligence components (e.g., ML/DL) in 
automated vehicles with specific focus on the optimization of 
the test cases, application of testing activities in different 
phases of the development lifecycle and testing for AI 
robustness against adversary machine learning. It is also 
recommended that research outputs should be standardized 
to support harmonized testing of AVs. 
Industry, research 
10 Specific measures must be defined and adopted for the Over 
The Air (OTA) software update of the Machine Learning/Deep 
Learning algorithms in Autonomous Vehicles. Software 
update in this context may also mean update of the ML/DL 
learning hyper-parameters and weights.   
Industry, research 
11 Because the number of possible scenarios for testing AVs 
can be unbounded and it can also vary depending on the 
operational context of the AV (e.g., commercial vehicle, 
passenger vehicle), it is important to define selection criteria 
to identify a limited but still suitable set of test scenarios.  
Additional research efforts are needed in this area. 
Industry, research 
12 A public-private partnership should be set-up to design, 
develop and deploy a scenario database for Type Approval of 
automated vehicles. The scenario database includes the 
processes to define a scenario language, methodology to 
create and apply scenarios and processes to improve the 
scenarios on the basis of market surveillance. 
Regulation, industry 
13 The results from the PEGAGUS project must be evaluated by 
an impartial committee to decide which elements can be 
included in a European wide scenario database framework 
for the testing of AVs 
Regulation, industry 
14 A process for the collection of data used to update existing 
scenarios must be defined with a clear definition of roles for 
the main stakeholders in the automated vehicle domain (e.g., 
manufacturers, law enforcers and consumers’ 
associations.) 
Regulation, industry 
 
6.2 Discussion 
The recommendations identified in the previous subsection address different aspects of Type Approval in 
AV with a number of recommendations focused on the artificial intelligence components in the AV since it 
is a largely unexplored area where the complexity of the problem faces severe time requirements for 
safety reasons.  
There is some overlapping and dependencies among the different recommendations.  Recommendation 
2 on efficient software testing for software update overlaps with recommendation 10, which is focused on 
the update and testing of the artificial intelligence (AI) components (ML/DL algorithms). Even if there is 
overlapping, the distinction between the recommendations should be maintained because the testing and 
update process for AI components can be quite different from the general software update. For example, 
the AI update may be only limited to the update of the ML/DL hyper parameters defined in the algorithms. 
Recommendation 14 on the collection of information from the field to enhance and update existing testing 
scenarios has also some overlap with Recommendation  4 in regards to the cybersecurity aspects, where 
a vulnerability database is created for vulnerabilities/threats identified in the field. On the other side, the 
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recommendations 4 and 14 should be kept distinct because they may be implemented by different 
stakeholders (cybersecurity agencies and experts for 4 and transportation experts for 14). 
Recommendation 2 on the definition of efficient software testing to support a rapid testing and 
deployment of software updates may be dependent on Recommendation 11 for the definition of 
criteria/metrics for the proper selection of testing scenarios. 
Recommendation 8 on the design of ML/DL algorithms to make them robust against AML is dependent on 
Recommendation 9 for the definition of specific tests for AI because such testing will also include 
robustness against AML. 
Recommendation 12 on the definition of a public/private partnership to create a scenario database is 
dependent on recommendation 7 for the definition of public/private partnership to design a simulated test 
environment. 
Such overlapping and dependencies are related to the consideration that each recommendation is 
focused on a function or set of functions but Type Approval is composed by many functions, which are all 
needed to guarantee the safety of the AV before AVs are deployed on the road. This is the reason why 
Recommendation 1 is proposed in this report.  
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7 Conclusions 
This report has conducted an analysis on three main aspects of testing and certification of automated 
vehicles: cybersecurity testing, testing of the artificial intelligence algorithms and definition of the testing 
scenarios, which can be part of the Type Approval. These aspects are related among them because 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities can negatively impact the safety of the automated vehicle. Testing of the 
artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms is a significant part of the overall testing of automated vehicles 
because the AI algorithms are ultimately responsible for the driving actions at high levels of automation. 
Testing and certification of automated vehicles is a new area where there are still many open questions 
at regulatory, industry and research levels. This report proposes a set of recommendations for policy 
makers, standardization bodies, industry and research communities to foster an adequate testing of 
automated vehicles before they are deployed in the market. The recommendations are focused on the 
most critical areas for the operation and deployment of automated vehicles, where further studies and 
experimental activities are required.  In particular, this report recommends the creation of public/private 
partnerships to foster the definition of harmonized testing scenarios to support the Type Approval 
process. A fragmentation of scenarios and testing processes may introduce gaps in Type Approval, which 
negatively impact AV safety. A set of recommendations are defined to improve the cybersecurity aspects 
in AVs both to support specific efforts to improve cybersecurity testing of AV and to create a vulnerability 
database for AV, which can enhance the cybersecurity testing scenarios. 
Another set of recommendations is focused on the definition of software update processes in AV which 
can benefit from efficient testing processes to support a safe and rapid deployment of new software 
releases in AVs in the field. The robustness of the machine learning/deep learning algorithms of the 
artificial intelligence components in the AV is also addressed in another set of recommendations. In 
particular, this report recommends the definitions of specific testing processes for machine 
learning/deep learning algorithms and further study to make them more robust against adversarial 
machine learning and cybersecurity threats. 
Further developments of this report will investigate how the recommendations presented in this report 
can be discussed in consultations with the government, industry, research and user communities to be 
implemented in policies and standards. 
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Term Definition Reference 
Approval Authority ‘approval  authority’  means the  authority  or  authorities  
of  a  Member State, notified  to  the  Commission by  that 
Member State,  with competence for  all  aspects of  the  
type-approval of  a  vehicle, system, component or  
separate technical unit, or  of  the  individual vehicle 
approval,  for  the  authorisation process for  parts  and  
equipment, for issuing and, if appropriate, for 
withdrawing or refusing approval certificates, for 
acting as the contact point for the approval  authorities  
of  the  other Member States,  for  designating the  
technical services, and  for  ensuring  that  the 
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conformity of production; 
(EC 2018) 
Automated Vehicle "automated vehicle" means a motor vehicle designed 
and constructed to move autonomously for certain 
periods of time without continuous driver supervision 
but in respect of which driver intervention is still 
expected or required 
(EC 2019b) 
Certificate of 
Conformity 
‘certificate of conformity’ means the document issued 
by the manufacturer which certifies that a produced 
vehicle conforms to the approved type of vehicle and 
complies with all regulatory acts that were applicable at 
the time of its production; 
(EC 2018) 
Component ‘component’  means a  device that  is  intended  to  be  part  
of  a  vehicle, that  can  be  type-approved independently 
of a vehicle and that is subject to the requirements of  
this Regulation (EC 2018) or any of  the regulatory acts 
listed in Annex II of (EC 2018) where the specific 
regulatory act makes express provision to that effect; 
(EC 2018) 
Cybersecurity ‘cybersecurity’ means the activities necessary to 
protect network and information systems, the users of 
such systems, and  other  persons  affected  by  cyber  
threats. 
(EC 2019a) 
Cybersecurity 
Certification 
Cybersecurity certification requires the formal 
evaluation of products, services and processes by an 
independent and accredited body against a defined set 
of criteria, standards, and the issuing of a certificate 
indicating conformance; as such cybersecurity 
certification plays a key role role in increasing trust and 
security in products, services and processes. 
Cybersecurity certification in the EU serves the purpose 
of providing notice and assurance to users about the 
level of conformity against stated requirements. EU 
cybersecurity certification schemes serve as the 
vehicle to convey such requirements from the EU policy 
ENISA4  
 
                                          
4 ENISA Web site on cybersecurity certification https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/standards/certification. 
 
61 
level to the industry service provision level and further 
to the users and conformity assessment bodies. 
Cyber Threat ‘cyber threat’ means any potential circumstance, event 
or action that could damage, disrupt or otherwise 
adversely impact network and information systems, the 
users of such systems and other persons; 
(EC 2019a) 
EU type approval ‘EU  type-approval’ means the  procedure whereby an  
approval  authority  certifies that  a  type of  vehicle, 
system, component or separate technical unit satisfies 
the relevant administrative provisions and technical 
requirements of this Regulation; 
(EC 2018) 
ICT product ‘ICT  product’  means  an  element  or  a  group  of  
elements  of  a  network  or  information  system; 
(EC 2019a) 
Manufacturer ‘manufacturer’ means a natural or legal person who is 
responsible for all aspects of the type-approval of a 
vehicle, system,  component or  separate technical unit, 
or  the  individual vehicle approval, or  the  authorisation 
process for parts  and  equipment, for  ensuring  
conformity of  production and  for  market  surveillance 
matters regarding that vehicle, system, component, 
separate technical unit, part  and  equipment produced, 
irrespective of  whether or  not that person is directly 
involved in all stages of  the design and construction of  
that vehicle, system,  component or separate technical 
unit concerned; 
(EC 2018) 
Market surveillance ‘market surveillance’ means the activities carried out  
and measures taken by the market surveillance 
authorities to ensure that  vehicles, systems,  
components and  separate technical units as  well  as  
parts  and  equipment made available on the market 
comply with the requirements set out in the relevant 
Union harmonisation legislation and do not endanger 
health, safety, the environment or any other aspect of 
public interest protection. 
(EC 2018) 
Motor Vehicle ‘motor  vehicle’ means any  power-driven  vehicle that  is  
designed and  constructed to  be  moved  by its  own  
means, that has  at  least four  wheels, is  complete,  
completed  or  incomplete,  and  has  a  maximum design 
speed exceeding 25 km/h; 
(EC 2018) 
National type 
approval 
‘national type-approval’ means the procedure whereby 
an approval authority certifies that a type of vehicle, 
system, component or separate technical unit satisfies 
the relevant administrative provisions and technical 
requirements laid down by  the  law  of  a  Member State,  
the  validity of  such approval being restricted  to  the  
territory of  that Member State; 
(EC 2018) 
Placing on the market ‘placing on  the  market’ means making available a  
vehicle, system, component, separate technical unit, 
part  or equipment for the first time in the Union; 
(EC 2018) 
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Technical Service ‘technical  service’  means an  organisation or  body 
designated  by  the  approval  authority  as  a  testing 
laboratory to carry  out  tests,  or  as  a  conformity 
assessment body to  carry  out  the  initial assessment 
and  other tests or inspections; 
(EC 2018) 
Type Approval Type-Approval  means the  procedure whereby an  
approval authority  certifies  that  a  type of  vehicle, 
system, component or separate technical unit satisfies 
the relevant administrative provisions and technical 
requirements. 
(EC 2018) 
Vehicle on-board 
diagnostic 
‘vehicle on-board diagnostic (OBD) information’ means 
the  information generated  by  a  system that  is  on  
board a vehicle or that is connected to an engine, and 
that is capable of detecting a malfunction, and, where 
applicable, is capable of  signalling its  occurrence by  
means of  an  alert  system, is  capable of  identifying the  
likely area  of malfunction by  means of  information 
stored  in  a  computer  memory,  and  is  capable of  
communicating that information off-board; 
(EC 2018) 
Virtual Testing 
method 
‘virtual  testing method’ means computer  simulations, 
including calculations, to  demonstrate that a  vehicle, a  
system,  a  component  or  a  separate technical unit  
fulfils  the  technical requirements of  a  regulatory act  
listed  in Annex II without requiring the use of a physical 
vehicle, system, component or separate technical unit; 
(EC 2018) 
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